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Abstract 
We consider the problem of choosing a single allocation from the set of feasible 
allocations in economic environments. We may use mechanisms which determine the 
final allocation on the basis of preferences of agents. However, selfish agents may 
manipulate their preferences in order to achieve an allocation in their favor. To overcome 
this difficulty, we must design strategy-proof mechanisms in which truthful revelation of 
preferences is a dominant strategy for each agent. In this thesis , we study the possibility 
of designing strategy-proof mechanisms in several economic environments. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, we consider the mechanism design problem for the allocation of 
an indivisible good when monetary compensation is possible. In Chapter 2, we consider 
the possibility of designing strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms on finitely 
restricted preference domains. First, we show that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto 
efficient mechanism on some preference domains consisting of a sufficiently large but 
finite number of quasi-linear preferences. Next, we prove that there is no strategy-proof, 
Pareto efficient, and equally compensatory mechanism on arbitrarγpreference domains 
consisting of more than three quasi-linear preferences. 1We conclude that the impossibility 
of strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms is very strong. In Chapter 3, we give 
up Pareto efficiency and try to understand the structure of strategy-proof mechanisms. 
We characterize the set of strategy-proof, individually rational , equally compensatory , 
demand monotonic mechanisms. Those mechanisms have the following properties: (i) 
they determine the allocation of monet紅ycompensation depending only on who receives 
the indivisible good; (i) they allocate the indivisible good to one of the pre-specified one 
or two agent(s); and (ii) they disregard preferences of agents other than the pre-specified 
agent(s). This characterization enables us to understand that those mechanisms are very 
inefficient and asyrnme町lC.
In Chapters 4 -6, we consider the mechanism design problem for the provision of 
public goods. In Chapter 4 , we consider the effect of partial exclusion on the design of 
11 
-strategy-proof mechanisms for the provision of a fixed sized public project, that is , one 
indivisible unit of a non-rivalrous good. For the case of a non-excludable public project, 
we characterize the unanimous mechanisms by strategy-proofness , individual rationality , 
and citizen sovereignty. For the case of an excludable public project, we characterize the 
largest unanimous mechanisms by strategy-proofness, individual rationality, demand 
monotonicity, and access independence. We conclude that partial exclusion always 
improves the efficiency of strategy-proof mechanisms. In Chapter 5, we consider the 
effect of fixed costs on the design of strategy-proof mechanisms for the provision of 
public goods. First, we consider the case of a cost function without fixed costs. We show 
that the minimal provision mechanism is the unique mechanism satisfying strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, and the full-range property. Next, we consider the case 
of a cost function with positive fixed costs. We show that the restriction of the range of 
mechanisms is necessary for designing strategy-proof and individually rational 
mechanisms. This result implies that the existence of fixed costs limits the variety of our 
choices , and it is less desirable in terms of efficiency. In Chapter 6, we reconsider 
Serizawa's (1996) characterization of strategy-proof, individually rational, no 
exploitative, and non-bossy mechanisms for the provision of public goods. He leaves an 
open question whether or not non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We 
show that strategy-proofness , individual rationality , and no exploitation imply non-
bossiness. As a corollary , we provide a new characterization of strategy-proof, 
individually rational, and no exploitative mechanisms. 
--圃』
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
We consider the problem of choosing a single allocation in econorruc environments ・
When a society consisting of several agents has to choose from the set of feasible 
allocations, it may rely on a certain mechanism which deterrrunes the final allocation on 
the basis of preferences of agents. Formally, a mechanism is a function which associates 
a feasible allocation with each combination of preferences of agents. We would like to 
design mechanisms which choose a desirable allocation (e.g. an efficient allocation , an 
equitable allocation, etc.) for each combination of preferences. Since preferences of 
agents are private information, agents are required to report their preferences in order to 
implement mechanisms. However, selfish agents may manipulate their preferences in 
order to achieve an allocation in their favor. As a result, the allocation chosen by the 
mechanism is desirable on the basis of reported preferences of agents , but may be far 
from desirable on the basis of true preferences of agents. This is the problem of 
manipulation. To overcome this problem, we must design mechanisms in which truthful 
revelation of preferences is a dorrunant strategy for each agent. We call such mechanisms 
strategy-proof(Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975). Agents have no incentive to 
manipulate their preferences in strategy-proof mechanisms. Strategy-proofness is an 
attractive requirement from the viewpoint of decentralization. An advantage of strategyｭ
proof mechanisms is the weakness of the assumption on informational requirements. 
Each agent is assumed to know his own preference, but not assumed to know other 
agents' preferences (in con仕astto Nash-type implement:ation) or prior distribution of 
preferences (in contrast to Bayesian implementation). In this thesis , we study the 
possibility of designing strategy-proof mechanisms which satisfy the other normative 
criteria in several econorruc environments. 
In Chapter 2, we consider econorrues with a single indivisible good and a transferable 
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good. The indivisible good can be consumed by only one agent. The transferable good、
regarded as money , is used for compensation. As examples , consider the division of an 
estate consisting of a house and cash in a bereaved family , and the allocation of a single 
task and bonuses in a firm. We consider mechanisms which determine who consumes the 
indivisible good and how much compensation the other agents receive on the basis of 
preferences of agents. We reg紅dthe following two axioms as desiderata for 
mechanisms. The first axiom is strategy-proofness. The second axiom is Pareto 
efficiency (the allocation chosen by the mechanism is always Pareto efficient). We 
consider the possibility of designing strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms in 
economies with an indivisible good and money. A general result of Holmstrりm(1979) 
implies that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism on the set of al 
quasi-line紅 preferences. However, it is well known that the possibility of designing 
strategy-proof mechanisms depends on the size of the preference domain of the 
mechanisms. Therefore, we tackle the question whether or not strategy-proof and Pareto 
efficient mechanisms exist given some restrictions of the preference domain of the 
mechanisms. 
First, we consider some finite restrictions of the preterence domain in order to 
understand how strong the impossibility result is. We show that there is no strategy-proof 
and Pareto efficient mechanism on some preference dornains consisting of a sufficiently 
lぉ"gebut finite number of quasi-line紅 preferences. The impossibility result holds true 
even on finitely restricted preference domains. A possible drawback of this result is that 
the preference domains consist of a very large number of preferences when the number of 
agents is large. Next, we impose an auxiliary axiom narned equal compensation (the nonｭ
consumers of the indivisible good receive the same amount of monet紅y compensation) 
and consider the possibility of such mechanisms on small preference domains. We show 
that there is no strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and equally compensatory mechanism on 
arbitrary preference domains consisting of more than three quasi-line紅 preferences.
Finally, we describe the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms on 
very small preference domains consisting of two or three quasi-linear preferences. We 
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conclude that the impossibility of strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism 
inevitable since such small preference domains are very unrealistic. 
In Chapter 3, we consider economies with a single indivisible good and a transferable 
good. By the results of Chapter 2, we must give up Pareto efficiency in order to design 
reasonable strategy-proof mechanisms. We think of the following four axioms as 
desiderata for mechanisms. The first axiom is strategy-proofness. The next two axioms 
are individual rationality (al agents end up no worse of: than at the status quo) and equal 
compensation, which 紅erelated to equity. The last axiom is demand monotonicity (the 
consumer of the indivisible good is unchanged when the consumer increases his demand 
for the indivisible good and no other agents increase their demand) , which is a weakening 
of Pareto efficiency. In this chapter we characterize the set of mechanisms which satisfy 
these :four axioms on the set of al quasi-linear preferences. As a result, we answer the 
questions (i) how inefficient strategy-proof mechanism:s are , and (i) how asymmetrγ 
strategy-proof mechanisms are. 
First, we show that if a mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness, equal compensation, 
and demand monotonicity , then it satisfies the constant transfer property (the allocation of 
monetary compensation depends only on who receives the indivisible good). Second, we 
prove that any mechanism which satisfies four axioms 鴿locates the indivisible good to 
one of the pre-speci白edone or two agent(s) , and disregards preferences of agents other 
than the pre-specified agent(s). When the set of potential consumers of the indivisible 
good consists of two agents (without loss of generality" we call them agents 1 and 2) , we 
define two types of mechanisms. The decisive mechanisms require that agent 1 (agent 2 
respectively) get the indivisible good if he w如ts it under a pre-specified monet紅y
compensation, and agent 2 (agent 1 respectively) get the indivisible good without 
compensation otherwise. The unilaterally unanimous mechanisms require that agent 1 
(agent 2 respectively) get the indivisible good if both agents want agent 1 (agent 2 
respectively) to get it under a pre-specified monet紅y compensation, and agent 2 (agent 1 
respectively) get the indivisible good without compensation otherwise. When the set of 
potential consumers consists of only one agent, we define the dictatorial mechanisms (one 
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of the agents always consumes the indivisible good without compensation). Finally 司 we
provide the following characterization: a mechanism satisfies strategy-proofne… 
individual rationality , equal compensation, and demand monotonicity if and only if it i 
decisive , unilaterally unanimous , or dictatorial. This characterization enables us to 
understand that those mechanisms 紅every inefficient and asymmetric. 
In Chapter 4 , we consider the provision of a fixed sized public project, that is , one 
indivisible unit of a non-rivalrous good. We first consider the case that the public project 
is non-excludable. As examples, consider the provision of national defense, pollution-
control devices, fireworks displays , and street lighting. Here we consider mechanisms 
which determine whether to provide the project and how to divide the costs among 
agents. We next consider the case that the public project is excludable. As examples , 
consider the provision of cable TV, computer networks, airports , and highways. Here we 
consider mechanisms which determine whether to provide the project, how to divide the 
costs among agents , and who is allowed to consume the project. 
Moulin (1994) characterizes "the conservative equal-costs mechanism" by coalitional 
strategy-proofness, individual rationality , and symmetry for the provision of non-
excludable public projects. Moreover, he proposes "the serial mechanism" for the 
provision of excludable public projects, and shows that the serial mechanism Pareto 
dominates the conservative equal-costs mechanisms. 
In this chapter we provide some characterizations by strategy-proofness instead of 
coalitional strategy-proofness for the provision of excludable versus non-excludable 
public projects. These characterizations enable us to unclerstand the effect of p紅tial
exclusion on the design of strategy-proof mechanisms. We regard the following axioms 
as desiderata for mechanisms. The first axiom is strategy-proofness. The next four 
auxiliary axioms 紅eindividual rationality, demand monotonicity (i) the set of consumers 
of the project cloes not shrink when the demancl of no agent decreases; and (i) the set of 
consumers of the project is unchanged when the demand of no current consumer 
decreases and the demand of no cuηent non-consumer increases) , citizen sovereignty 
(society has access to either level of the project) , and access independence (each agent has 
4 
access to either level of the project regardless of other agents' preferences). 
First, we consider the case of a non-excludable public project. Constant cost sharing 
pre-specifies a cost sharing pattern for society, and requires that if the project is provided , 
then agents should share its cost according to the cost sharing pattem. Serizawa (1996) 
shows that constant cost sharing is a necessary condition for strategy-proofness in the 
two-agent case. We prove that constant cost sharing is a necess紅y condition for strategyｭ
proofness and individual rationality in the n-agent case. The unanimous mechanisms are 
defined as follows: (i) they are constant cost sharing; and (i) they provide the project if 
each agent's willingness to pay is larger than or equal to his cost sh訂e. We characterize 
the unanimous mechanisms as the set of strategy-proof, individually rational , and citizen 
sovereign mechanisms. 
Second, we consider the case of an excludable public project. Semiconstant cost 
sharing pre-specifies a cost sharing pattem for each coalition, and requires that if the 
project is provided for agents in some coalition, then those agents should share its cost 
according to the cost sharing pattem for the coalition. V¥T e prove that semiconstant cost 
sharing is a necess紅y condition for strategy-proofness in the two-agent case, and it is a 
necess紅y condition for strategy-proofness, individual rationality , and demand 
monotonicity in the n-agent case. The largest unanimous mechanisms are defined as 
follows: (i) they 訂e semiconstant cost sharing; and (i) they provide the project for the 
largest coalition such that the willingness to pay of each member of the coalition is larger 
than or equal to his cost sh訂e. We characterize the largest unanimous mechanisms as the 
set of strategy-proof, individually rational , demand monotonic , and access independent 
mechanisms. 
Comparing the two classes of mechanisms , we conclude that p訂tial exclusion alway 
improves efficiency , that is, it is always possible to design some largest unanimou 
mechanism (for an excludable public project) which Pareto dominates a given unanimous 
mechanism (for a non-excludable public project). 
In Chapter 5, we consider the provision of public goods. Moulin (1994) characterizes 
"the conservative equal-costs mechanism" by coalitional strategy-proofness , individual 
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rationality , and symmetry in economies with one private good and one public good. Hi 
result relies on the assumption that public goods can be produced without fixed costs. It
is more natural , however, to assume that we need positive fixed costs to produce public 
goods. 1n this chapter we incorporate the consideration of fixed costs , and provide 
several characterizations by strategy-proofness instead of coalitional strategy-proofness. 
We introduce the notion of a cost sharing rule, which associates a cost sharing pattern 
with each level of public goods. Assuming that a cost sharing rule is exogenously given , 
we consider mechanisms which determine only the level of public goods. One 
interpretation of this model is that the revision of tax rules is less frequent than public 
decisions. We think of the following two axioms as desiderata for mechanisms. The first 
axiom is strategy-proofness. The second axiom is individual rationality. We characterize 
the set of strategy-proof and individually rational mechanisms. 
First, for the sake of comparison, we consider the case of a cost function without fixed 
costs. 1n economies with one private good and one public good, we show that the 
minimal provision mechanism is the unique mechanisITl satisfying strategy-proofness , 
individual rationality , and the full-range property (any feasible level of the public good is 
attainable by the mechanism) for a certain class of cost sharing rules. 1n economies with 
one private good and several public goods, it follows from a general result of Zhou 
(1991a) that there is no strategy-proof and individually rational mechanism. 
Next, we consider the case of a cost function with positive fixed costs. Since the cost 
function has fixed costs , it has the non-convexity. Thus , any cost sharing rule must have 
the non-convexity. We present the set of strategy-proof and individually rational 
mechanisms by restricting the range of mechanisms to recover the convexity of the cost 
h紅ing rule. Those mechanisms are the variants of the nlﾎnimal provision mechanism. 
Conversely, if the restriction of the range of mechanisms is not sufficient to recover the 
convexity of the cost sharing rule, the non-convexity prevents us from designing 
strategy-proof and individually rational mechanisms. These results imply that we must 
restrict the range of mechanisms if we want to design strategy-proof and individually 
rational mechanisms. 1n other words , the non-convexity of cost sharing rules limits the 
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variety of our choices , and therefore it is less desirable in terms of efficiency. 
In Chapter 6, we consider the provision of public goods. In contrast to Chapter 5, we 
consider mechanisms which determine both the level of public goods and how to divide 
the costs among agents. Serizawa (1996) characterizes the set of "semiconvex cost 
sharing schemes determined by the minimum demand principle" by strategy-proofness , 
individual rationality, no exploitation, and non-bossiness in economies with one private 
good and one public good. However, there is a criticisnrl on the non-bossiness axiom 
since the economic interpretation of non-bossiness is not so clear. Moreover, he leaves an 
open question whether or not non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. 
Therefore, it is an interesting question what class of mechanisms is characterized without 
non-bossiness. We show that any strategy-proof, individually rational , and no 
exploitative mechanism must satisfy non-bossiness in economies with one private good 
and one public good. As a corollary, we characterize the set of semiconvex cost sharing 
schemes dete口ninedby the minimum demand principle by strategy-proofness, individual 
rationality, and no exploitation. 
Chapter 2 
Strategy-Proof and Efficient Allocationl ofan Indivisible Good 
on Finitely Restricted Preference Domains * 
2.1. Introduction 
We consider economies with a single indivisible good a.nd a transferable good.1 The 
indivisible good can be consumed by only one agent. The transferable good, regarded as 
money , is used for compensation. We consider allocation mechanisms which determine 
who consumes the indivisible good and how much compensation the other agents receive 
on the basis of preferences of agents. We regard the following axioms as desiderata for 
mechanisms. The first axiom is strategy-proofness. A Inechanism satisfies strategy-
proofness if truthful revelation of preferences is a dominant strategy for each agent. The 
second one is Pareto efficiency. A mechanism satisfies Pareto efficiency if it always 
chooses a Pareto efficient allocation. We study the possibility of designing strategy-proof 
and Pareto efficient mechanisms. 
The possibility of designing strategy-proof mechanisms depends on the size of the 
preference domain of the mechanisms. In a social choice framework , Gibbard (1973) and 
Satterthwaite (1975) establish the impossibility of strategy-proof mechanisms when the 
preference domain is "unrestricted" , whereas Moulin (1980) and Barbera and Jackson 
(1994) characterize a rich class of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and anonymous 
mechanisms when the preference domain is restricted to "single peaked" preferences. 
In two-agent pure exchange economies, Zhou (1991 b) shows that there is no strategy-
proof, Pareto efficient, and non-dictatorial mechanism on the usual economic preference 
domain , and Schummer (1997) proves the same impossibility result even when the 
事 This chapter is based on Ohseto (1999c). 
I This type of economies has been studied in much of the 1iterature. For details, see Tadenuma and 
Thornson ( 1993 , 1995). 
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preference domain is restricted to (i) "homothetic" preferences, or (i) more than three 
"linear" preferences. Therefore, the impossibility of strategy-proof and Pareto efficient 
mechanisms is well established in the two-agent case. 
However, when we consider economies with private goods, there is a crucial 
difference between the two-agent case and the case of rnore than two agents. Satterthwaite 
and Sonnenschein (1981) point out that there exist strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and 
non-dictatorial mechanisms in the case of more than two agents. However, it is very 
difficult to characterize such strategy-proof mechanisms because of the concept of 
strategy-proofness and the presence of private goods. ~fhen some agent (e.g. agent 1) 
changes his preference and others remain unchanged , strategy-proofness puts constraint 
on agent 1's consumption bundle directly , but on other agents' consumption bundles 
indirectly (e.g. through budget balance). Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) 
introduce non-bossiness to overcome this difficulty. Barbera and Jackson (1995) also use 
non-bossiness in order to characterize the set of strategy-proof and anonymous 
mechanisms in the case of more than two agents. However, we do not invoke non-
bossiness since the economic interpretation of non-bossiness is not so clear. 
We consider the possibility of strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms in 
economies with an indivisible good and money. A general result of Holmstrりm (1979) 
implies that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism on the set of al 
quasi-line紅 preferences.2 First, we consider some finite restrictions of the preference 
domain in order to understand how strong the impossibility result is. We show that there 
is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism on some preference domains 
consisting of a sufficiently large but finite number of quasi-line紅 preferences. The 
impossibility result holds true even on finitely restricted preference domains. A possible 
drawback of this result is that the preference domains consist of a very large number of 
preferences when the number of agents is large. Next, we impose an auxiliary axiom 
2 To escape the impossibility result, one may weaken the incentive criterion from strategy-proofness to 
Bayesian incentive compatibility (d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet, 1979; Myerson and Satterthwaite, 
1983). 
9 
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、qual compensation" and consider the possibility of such mechanisms on small 
preference domains. We show that there is no strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and 
equally compensatory mechanism on arbitrary preference domains consisting of more 
than three quasi-line紅 preferences. Finally, we describe the structure of strategy-proof 
and Pareto efficient mechanisms on very small preference domains consisting of two or 
three quasi-linear preferences. We conclude that the impossibility of strategy-proof and 
Pareto efficient mechanisms is inevitable since such small preference domains 紅e very 
unrealistic. 
This chapter is organized as follows. 1n Section 2.2, we introduce notation and 
definitions. In Section 2.3 , we show the main impossibility result on sufficiently large 
but finite preference domains. 1n Section 2 .4, we show some impossibility results on 
small preference domains. 1n Section 2.5 , we summarize the results. 
2.2. Notation and Definitions 
We consider econornies with a single indivisible good and a transferable good. The 
indivisible good can be consumed by only one agent. The transferable good, regarded as 
money , is used for compensation. Let N = { 1,…,n} (nミ2) be the set of agents. For each 
iεN， the consumption space of agent i isthe set of pairs (tj ， Xj)εRx {O, 1 }, where tj
denotes money he receives and Xj denotes his consumption of the indivisible good. The 
amount of money each agent receives may be negative. Each agent iεN has a quasi-linear 
preference on his consumption space. Let U A be the set of al quasi-linear preferences on 
Rx {O, 1} which can be represented by a quasi-linear utility function Uj(tj , Xj)=tj+Vj(Xj). 
For each UjεUA， let 入(ui) denote agent i's willingness to pay for the indivisible good, that 
is, Uj(tj ， O)=Uj (tj- 入(Uj) ，1) for al tjεR. We consider an arbitrary preference domain U 
which is a finite subset of U A. Let #U denote the number of preferences in U. A 
preference profile is a list u=(u 1, • • • ，u n)εUn. Let M be the amount of money which is 
allocated to agents. We assume that M is known and fixed. The set of feasible allocations 
is Z={Z=(tl ，... ，tn;Xl ，"'，Xn)ε Rnx{O ， l}nl エ tj = M and エ Xj = l}. The set of feasible 
ieN ieN 
transfer allocations is ZT={t=(tl ,. ..,tn)E Rnl L. tj = M}. A mechαnism (defined on UI1) i 
? ?唱'EA
a function f: U n• Z , which associates a feasible allocation with each preference profile. 
Let F(Un) be the set of mechanisms (defined on Uり. Given fεF(U n ) and uεu n ， we write 
as f(u)=(t}(u) ,...,tn(u);x}(u) ,.…,Xn(u)) , fj(u)=(tj(u) ,Xj(u)) , and ft(u)=(t}(u) ,...,tn(u)) 
Given fE F(Un), let Cf(U)= {iεNI xj(u)=l} denote the consumer of the indivisible good at 
uεun . Given uεun ， iεN ， and UjεU， the notation (百j ，U_j) represents the preference profile 
obtained from U after the replacement of Uj by Uj ・ Weintroduce the main axioms. 
Definition 2.1. A mechanism f，εF(Un) satisfies strategy-proofness i百 for al Uεun ， 
iεN ， and UjεU ， uj(fj(u))三Uj(fj (Uj , U_j)). 
Strategy-proofness states that ruthful revelation of preferences is a dominant strategy 
for each agent. If a mechanism fE F(Un) does not satisfy strategy-proofness , then there 
exist UεUn ， iεN ， and UjεU such that uj(fj (百j ， U_j))>Uj(fj(u)). We then say that agent i can 
manipulate f atU via Uj ・
Definition 2.2. A mechanism f，εF(U n ) satisfies Pareto efficiency if for al UεUn ， 
there is no zεZ such that [for al iεN ， Uj(tj ， Xj)三Uj(fj(u))] and [for some iεN ， 
Uj(tj , Xj)>uj(fj(u))]. 
Definition 2.3. A mechanism fEF(Un) satisfies equal compensαtion if for al Uεu n 
and i, j~ Cf(U) , tj(u)=tj(u). 
Equal compensation requires that the non-consumers of the indivisible good should 
receive the same amount of money. 
The following lemma is a well known result, and the proof wiU be omitted (see e.g. 
Mas-Colell , Whinston , and Green (1995) , p. 862). 
Lemma 2.1. A mechanism fE F( Un) satisfies Pareto φ・ciency ~f and only if for al 
uε u l1 ， Cr(u)cArgmax ( λ(Ui) } . 
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2.3. Sufficiently Large but Finite Preference Domains 
A general result of Holmstrりm(1979) implies that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto 
efficient mechanism on the set of al quasi-line紅 preferences.
Theorem 2.1. (Holmstrりm， 1979). There is no strategy-proof and Pareto effi・cient
mechαηismj主 F(U幻 3
Notice that the preference domain considered in Holnlstrりm(1979) contains an infinite 
number of preferences. We consider the possibility of st:rategy-proof and Pareto efficient 
mechanisms on some finite subsets of quasi-line紅 preferences. Given two integers a, b 
arbitrarily , let [a,...,b] denote the set of integers between a and b inclusive. Let 
U [a ,b]= {UiεUAI 入(Uj)ε[a ，…，b]}. 
The following lemma presents a necessary condition of strategy-proof and Pareto 
efficient mechanisms when the preference domain is restricted to U [a ,b]. It states that if 
agent j consumes the indivisible good at preference profile u, and if the other agent i can 
consume it by changing his preference, then the amount of money agent i receives 
decreases by 入(uj)-1 at least and 入(Uj)+1 atmost. In other words , agent i must pay 入(Uj)-
1 atleast and 入(Uj)+1 atmost in order to consume the indivisible good. 
Lemma 2.2. Assume that a mechanism j色町U[a ， b]) satiぞfies strategy-proofness αnd 
Pareto ~がcie町y. For αlluεUム+1 ,b-l]' iε N， and 五iε U[a ， b]. ザ Cr(u)= {jj可ij=Cr (ui， u- iJ, 
then λ(Uj少l三tJu)-tJ五i. U-i)~λ(uj)+l. 
Proof. Suppose first 伽t for some uεULib-ll ， iεN ， and UjE U [a ,b] , 
Cf(U)= {j }判 i}=Cf(Ui ， U-i) and ti(U)-tj(Uj ， U_j)<入(uj)-1. Let ÛjεU [a ,b] be such that 
入(立j)=入(uj)-1. It follows from Lemma 2.1 that Cf(立j ， u_i) :;t {i}. By strategy-proofness , 
.3 By using a general result of Holmstr? (1 979) , Schummer (1998) proves that there is no strategy-proof 
and Pareto eficient mechanism on the set of al quasi-linear preferences in economies with multiple 
匤divisible goods and money. 
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fi (立i ，U_j)=(ti(U),O). Since Ûi (ti(可， U・ i ) ， l ) =立i( tï(Ui ， U-i)+入(ÎÛi) ， O) >Ûi( ti(U ) ー
入(Uj)+1 +入(立ï) ，O)=Ûi (ti (U) ，O) ， agent i can manipulate f at(立i ，U-i) via 百i .
Suppose next that for some UεULIb-l]'iεN ， and UiE U[a ,b] , 
Cf(U )={j}判 i }=Cf(百i ，u_? and ti(U)-ti(Ui , U-i)>入(Uj)+1. Let 立iεU [a ,b] be such that 
入(Ûi )=入(Uj)+1. It follows from Lemma 2.1 that Cf(丸 U・ i)={i}. By strategy-proofness , 
fi (立i ，U-i)=(ti(Ui , U-i) , 1). Since Ûi(ti(U) ，O)=古i(ti(U)四入(Ûi) ，1 )>Ûj(ti (Ui , U-i )+入(Uj) +1-
入(立j ) ，1 )=Ûi(ti(Ui , U-i) , 1), agent i can manipulate f at(立i ， U-i) via Ui. Q.E.D. 
We show the non-existence of strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms on a 
sufficiently large but finite number of quasi-linear preferences. 
2"+2n2-2n-2 Theorem 2.2. Let U[a ,b] be such that b-α> 一一一. There is no strategy-proof 
n-l 
αndPαreto efficient mechanismfEF(U[a ,b]J 
Proof. Suppose that there exists a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism 
た F(U[a ， b])' For each iεN ， let uj ， utεU [a,b] be such that 入(uj)=a+i and 入(ut)=b-i. Then , 
21_2 T , T T* 入(Uï)< . .<入(U~)<入(U~)<. ..<入(Ut) and 入(時)ー入(uh)>17 LettJ =i二 (巾t}. Let 
U *={UεU * I there 紅ean even number of agents who reveal ut at u} and ﾛ >;< = {uεU * I there 
紅e an odd number of agents who reveal ut at u}. By bu匂et balance, we have that 
エ ti(u)=M
ieN 
エ ti(u)=M
ieN 
for al UεU >;< ， and 
for al uεU. 
(2.1 ) 
(2.2) 
We provide necess紅yconditions on ti ( ・ ) for any pair of preference profiles where 
only agent i reveals different preferences, that is, (uj , U-i ), (ut , U-i)εU >;< . We consider the 
following six cases. 
Case 1. Let (uj , U-i)εU and (ut , U-i)εU * be such that Cf(uj , U-i)={j} with j 壬i. It 
follows from Lemma 2.1 that C f(ut , uィ )={j}. By strategy-proofness , 
ti(uj ,u-i)-ti(ut,u-i)=O. (2.3) 
Case 2. Let (uj , U -i)εU * and (ut,u-i)EÛ* be such that Cf(uj,u-i )= {j} withj::;i. It 
follows from Lemma 2.1 that Cf(ut , U_j)= {j}. By strategy-proofness , 
ti(uj , U-i)-ti(ut , U_i)=O. (2.4) 
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Case 3. Let (uj , U-i)εU and (ut， u・i)εU * be such that Cf(uj , U-i)={j} with i<j<n. 
Suppose that agent j reveals uj at (uj , U-i). Since 入(uj) <入(u~)<入(u~) ， it follows from 
Lemma 2.1 that Cf(uj , U_i):;t {j}. This is a contradiction. I-Ience , agent j reveals uj at 
(uj ,u_J It follows from Lemma 2.1 that Cf(ut,u-i)={i}. It follows from Lemma 2.2 that 
入(uj)ー l~ti(uj ， U-i)-ti(U七 U-i)~入(uj)+1 (2.5) 
Case 4. Let (uj , U_i)E U* and (ut , u・i)εU be such that Cf(uj, U-i)={j} with i<j<n. 
Suppose that agentj reveals uj at (uj ， u・ i)' Since 入(uj)<入(u~)<入(u古)， it follows from 
Lemma 2.1 that Cf(uj ， u・ i) :;t{j}. This is a contradiction. Hence, agent j reveals uj at 
(uj ,u-i)' It follows from Lemma 2.1 that Cf(ut,u-i)={i}. It follows from Lemma 2.2 that 
入(uj)-l 壬ti(uj ，U-i)-ti(ut, U-i)三入(uj)+1. (2.6) 
Case 5. Let (uj , U-i)εU and (ut , U-i)εU * be such that Cf(uj , u・ i)={j} with i<j=n. That 
is , (uj , u-i)=(uïぃ・叫-1'ut). It follows from Lemma 2.1 that Cf(ut, U-i)= {i}. It follows 
from Lemma 2.2 that 
入(ut)ー l~ti(uj ，U-i)-ti(ut, U-i)三入(ut)+1. (2.7) 
Case 6. Let (uj , U-i)εU * and (117， u，i)εU* be such that Cf(uLu-i)={jjwith i<j=n.That 
is , (uj , u-i)=(uï ，一.，u~). It follows from Lemma 2.1 that Cf(ut,u-i)={i}. It follows from 
Lemma 2.2 that 
入(u~)ー l~ti(uj ，U-i)-ti(ut, U-i)三入(u~)+1. (2.8) 
We count the number of inequalities derived in Cases 3 and 4. Fix any j (:;t 1,n). The 
condition Cf(uj ,u_i)= {j} requires that ul=uï ,...,Uj-l=Uj_l ,Uj=uj. Each agent k=l ,..., j-1 
is a possible candidate for agent i. Each agent l=j+ 1 ,...,n reveals either u? or uj. Thus , 
for any j (:;t 1,n) , we derive U-1).2n-J inequalities. By the summation throughj , we have 
thatE o-l)?j=2{主l G-l) アj)-E G-1)Y叫ル1+2n-2+ . . . +2勺(叫)=212-2(n-
2)=2{エ 2j } ーヱ 2j_2(n-2)=2n-22-2(n-2)=2n-2n. Notice that each case provides the same 
number of inequalities for any j (:;t1 ,n). Therefore , each case provides 2 n-l_n inequalities. 
We count the number of inequalities derived in Cases 5 and 6. The condition 
Cf(uj ,u_i)={n} requires that ul=uï ，...， Un-l=U~_l' Each agent k=l ，.・.， n-1 is a possible 
candidate for agent i.Agent n reveals either u~ or u~. Thus , we derive 2(n-1) inequalities 
otice that each case provides the sむne number of inequalities. Therefore, each case 
14 
provides n-1 inequalities. 
We consider the summation of al the equations (or inequalities) in (2 .1 ), (2.3) 、 (2. 5 ) ‘
(2.7) and al the equations (or inequalities) multiplied -1 in (2.2), (2 .4), (2 .6), (2.8). For 
each uεU* and iεN ， the te口ntj(u) appears once in (2.1) and once in one of (2 . 3 ) ー (2. 8 ) .
For each uεU andiεN， the term tj(u) appears once in (2.2) and once in one of (2 .3 ) ー
(2.8). Notice that the terms tj(u) cancel out each other in the summation proces. Since 
(2.1) and (2.2) provide the same number of equations , the terms M cancel out each other 
in the summation process. Since (2.5) and (2.6) provide the same number of inequalities 
for any j (:;t 1,n) , the terms 入(uj) cancel out each other in the summation proces. 
Therefore, the summation provides the inequality -2 n+2+(n-1){λ(u~)ー入(u~) } S;O壬2n -
2+(n-l ){λ(u~)-入(u~)}. Since 入(u~)-λ(u~) >ユニ~， the left-hand inequality is a 
n-1 
contradiction. Q.E.D. 
2.4. Small Preference Domains 
In this section we consider the possibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and equally 
compensatory mechanisms on small preference domains. That is , we tackle the question 
whether or not, given any restriction of the preference domain, such mechanisms exist. 
We describe a fundamental structure of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and equally 
compensatory mechanisms. We show that those mechanisms almost satisfy the constant 
transfer property: transfer allocations depend only on who consumes the indivisible good. 
We introduce some formal notation and definitions. A tr・ansfer allocαtionβmction is a 
function π:N→ZT ， which associates a feasible transfer allocation with each consumer of 
the indivisible good. For each iεN ， we let π(i)=(π1 (i)，...，πj(i) ，.. .,1tn(i)) , where 1tj(i) 
represents the amount of money agent j receives when agent i consumes the indivisible 
good. Let rdenote the set of tran牧r allocationμlctions. A mechanism fE F(Un) 
satisfies the consωnt tranφr property on V. (v. cUn) relαtive to πε 刀 i百 for al uε v. ， 
[Cf(u)={i} ニコ ft (u)=π( i )]. 
Given an 紅bit町 preference domain U, we let up , u{εU be such 伽t
入(uP)三入(U j)三入(u{) for al UjE U. Such up and u{ exist uniquely since U is a finite subset of 
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quasi-linear preferences. Given the Cartesian product of the preference domain Uへ we let 
r(un)={uεUnl there is at most one agent who reveals up atu}. 
Ohseto (1999b) shows that any strategy-proof , Pareto efficient , and equally 
compensatory mechanism f，εF(U~) satisfies the constant transfer property on u~ relative 
to someπε I1. When the preference domain is finitely restricted, we can show the 
following limited version of that result.4 
Lemma 2.3. If α mechαnism fiモ F(Un ) sαtisfies strαtegy-proofness， Pareto c:汀lciency，
αnd equal compensαtion， then f sαtisfies the constαnt trα:nsfer property on T( Uれ) relαtÎve 
to some πEII. 
Proof. It is sufficient to show that Cf(U)=Cf(百) implies f( u )=f(百) for al u, Uεr(u n ) . 
Without loss of generality, we assume that Cf(U)=Cf(函)=:{ 1 }.It follows from Lemma 2.1 
that only agent 1 may reveal u? at u, U. It follows from Lemma 2.1 that 
Cf(U? ,U-l)=Cf(U? ,U-l)={ 1}. By strategy-proofness , f 1 (u)=f1 (u? ， u・ 1) and 
f1 (百)=f1(u? ，玩 1) ' By equal compen淵ion ， f(u)=f(u7 , u・]) and f(百)=f(u? ，U-l). It follows 
from Lemma 2.1 that Cf( uいふu3 ， • • • ，Un)=Cf(U?，叫ん，…ん)={1}. By strategy-
proo白ess ， f2(u? , u_l)=f2(UいらU3 ，.. . ,Un) and f2 (u? ，江 1 )ゴポU1ui，b ， ん). By equal 
compensation, f(u? , U-1 )=f(u? , u~ ， U3 ,... ，u州lnρ1) and f(u? , 百玩-1ο)=f(u叶1均11い，λ， uιI
a叩pp判lying the same argument to the remaining agents, we have that f(u)=f(u? , u~ 1) and 
f(百)=f(u? ， u~]). Therefore , f(u)=f(U). Q.E.D. 
We show the non-existence of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and equally 
compensatory mechanisms on arbitrary preference domains which consist of more than 
three quasi-line紅 preferences.
4 Let u={ur， u~ }， where 入(u?)=l and 入(u~)=2.Let n=3 and a mechanism fεF(Un) be such that 
f(u1 , uï , u~)=f(u~ ， uï , U3)=( -1 ,112,112; 1 ,0,0), f(uj , u~ ， u3)=f(u~ ， u~ ， u ~)=(2/3 ， -4/3 ,2/3 ;0,1,0), 
f(u吋1)，いい'パ， uιI
satisfies strat臼egy-p戸ro∞ofness ，Pareto efficiency, and equal compensation, but does not satisfy the constant 
transfer property on Un. 
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Theorem 2.3. Let 町三4. There ﾎs no strategy-prooj~ Pareto efficient, and equally 
compensαtoγymechαnismfiモ F( むれ). 
Proof. Let uf, up , uf，可 be preferences in U such that 入(uf)<入(up)<入(uf)<入(u?)
Suppose that there exists a strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and equally compensatory 
mechanism fE F(Un). It follows from Lemma 2.3 that f satisfies the constant transfer 
property on r(Un) relative to some 1tE I1. Notice that (叶，.. . ， u~) ， (U) ,... ， U~)E r(U n), and 
for al iεN ， (uP , U~j) ， (u?, U~j)εr(un). First, we assume that Cf(u1 ,. .. ， u~)= {j}. It follow 
from Lemma 2.1 that for al i吋， Cf(uP ， u~j)={i}. By strategy-proofness , 
Uf(1t j (j)，O)三Uf(1t j (i) , 1) and UP(1ti(i), 1)三UP(πiU) ， O). Hence , 1t j(i)+入(Uf)壬1t j (j)三πj(i)+λ(uP)
for al i:;tj. Adding up these inequalities for al i:;tj , we have that Iπj (i)+(n-
1)入(ur)~Iπj (j)三エ1tj(i)+(n-1)入(uP). By budget balance Iπj (j )=M， we have that (n由
i;tj i;tj ieN 
1)λ(ur)~M- Iπj(i)壬(n-1)入(uP). Next, we assume that Cf(U) ぃ.，U自)={k}. It follows 
from Lemma 2.1 that for al i北， Cf(u?， u~j)={i}. By strategy-proofness , 
ur(πj(k) ， O)三ur(1t j(i) ，1) and u?(πj(i) ， l)三u?(1t j(k) ， O). Hence , 
1tj (i)+入(UD~1t i(k)~1t j(i)+入(u?) for al i:;tk. Adding up these inequalities for al i:;tk , we 
have that エ πj(i)+(n-1)入(uD~Iπj(k)三エ πj(i)+(n-1)入(u?). By budget balance 
i;tk i;tk i;tk 
エ πj(k)=M ， we have that (n-1)入(uD三Mーエ πj(i)壬(n-1)入(u?). Since 入(uP)<入(uD ， this is 
ieN ie 
a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
We have two corollaries to Theorem 2.3. The first one follows from the fact that equal 
compensation is vacuously true when n=2. The second one follows from the fact that 
envy-freeness (Foley , 1967) implies Pareto efficiency and equal compensation in our 
model (Svensson , 1983). 
Corollarヲ 2. 1. Let n=2 αnd #U?三4. There is no str，αtegy-proofαndPαreto efficient 
mechanismfiε F(Un).5 
5 Schummer (1998) shows a similar result in economies with multiple indivisible goods and money. 
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Corollary 2.2. Le t 町三4. There is no strategy-proof and enνyてfree meclzanisl7l 
fモ F(U I1 ).も
Next, we characterize the set of strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms on 
very small preference domains in the two-agent case. The following two theorems show 
that strategy-proofness puts some constraint on transfer allocation functions. Itturns out 
that there is a trade-off between the restriction of the pre~erence domain and the constraint 
on transfer allocation functions. The arguments are much the same as Lemma 2.3 and 
Theorem 2.3 , and the proofs will be omitted. 
Lemma 2.4. Let n=2. lf α mechanismfEF(Un) sαtisfies strαtegy-proofness and 
Pαreto efficiency, then f satisfies the constant transfer properη on un relαtÎve to some 
πε 刀.
Theorem 2.4. Let n=2 and #U=3. Assume that U={uf, uf, uf), where 
λ(uf)<λ(uf)<λ(uf). A mechanismj主 F(Un) satiポes strategy-proofness αnd Pareto 
ザlciency if and only if (i) for al uε un， Cr似たArgmax ( λ(Ui)) ， and (i) f satiゆes the 
ﾎEN 
constant tr，αnsfer properη on Unrelαtive to some 冗モ II ， where ヱ πi(i)=M-Â(uf). 
ﾎEN 
Theorem 2ふ Let n=2 and #U=2. Assume thαt U={uf, uf), where λ(uf)<λ(uf). A 
mechanismfEF(UI1) satiφ白 strategy-proofness and Pareto ゆciency if and only if(i) 
for al uε un， Cr(u)cArgmax { λ(uiJ)， and (ii)fsatisfies the constant trans_作rproperty 0η 
ﾎEN 
ul1 relative ω some 7rEII , where M-Â(uf)壬ヱ πliJ三M-)~，(uf).
ﾎEN 
As in the two-agent case , we can design strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, equally 
compensatory mechanisms on very small preference dornains in the n-agent case. 
6 Italso fol1ows from a general result of Tadenuma and Thomson (1995) that there is no strategy-proof 
and envy-仕ee mechanism f，εF(U~) 
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Example 2.1. Let #U=3. Assume that U={uf,uP ,uf }, where 入(吋)<入(uP)<入(uf)
Consider mechanisms fεF(un) such that for al uεun ， (i) Cf(u)cArgmax {入(ui)} ， (ii)
刷 M-(n1)入(uf2_ flおor 凶机如制d (i川咋M円t州 f白()町m叫3訂川川rはal峠Cfば(uω). Thωh悶
mechanisms satisfy strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency , and equal compensation. 
Example 2.2. Let #U=2. Assume that U={uf,uPL where λ(uf) <入(uP). Consider 
mechanisms flεF(U n) such that for al uεun ， (i) Cf(u)cAぽgmax {入(Uj)} ， (i) 
ieN 
刷 M-(Il)入 foriE Cf(U)，加d (iii) 町 (u)=竺1_for al j~ Cf(U) , where À(Uf)~À' ~À(uP) 
Then , these mechanisms satisfy strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency , and equal 
???????????????
2.5. Conclusion 
We studied the problem of allocating a single indivisible good when monet紅y
compensation is possible. A genera1 result of Holmstrりm. (1979) implies that there is no 
strategy司proofand Pareto efficient mechanism on the set of al quasi-line紅 preferences.
We considered some finite restrictions of the preference domain in order to understand 
how strong the impossibility result is. We proved that there is no strategy-proof and 
Pareto efficient mechanism when (i) the preference domain consists of a sufficiently large 
but finite number of quasi-line紅 preferences (Theorem 2.2) , or (i) the preference domain 
consists of more than three quasi-linear preferences and equal compensation is imposed 
on mechanisms (Theorem 2.3). We conclude that the impossibility result is very strong 
since such drastic restrictions of the preference domain are very unrealistic. 
_.A固』
Chapter 3 
Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms 
for Economies with an Indivisible Good 料
3.1. Introduction 
We consider economies with a single indivisible good and a transferable good. The 
indivisible good can be consumed by only one agent. The transferable good, regarded as 
money, is used for compensation. This chapter looks for desirable allocation mechanisms 
which determine who consumes the indivisible good and how much compensation the 
other agents receive from the consumer. We think of the following four axioms as 
desiderata for mechanisms. The first axiom is strategy-proofness. Strategy-proofness 
states that truthful revelation of preferences is a dominant strategy for each agent. It is an 
attractive requirement from the viewpoint of decentralization. The next two axioms are 
related to equity. They are individual rationality (al agen1ts end up no worse off than at the 
status quo) and equal compensation (the non-consumers of the indivisible good receive 
the same amount of monetary compensation). The last axiom is demand monotonicity, 
which requires that the consumer of the indivisible good remain unchanged when the 
consumer increases his demand for the indivisible good and no other agents increase their 
demand. This requirement is necessary for Pareto efficiency , but rather weaker than 
Pareto efficiency. We attempt to design mechanisms that satisfy these four axioms. 
There is a huge literature on strategy-proofness. It is well known that strategy-
proofness is a strong requirement in a social choice framework. The Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) states that any strategy-proof 
mechanism whose r加gecontains more than two outcomes must be dictatorial. Under the 
requirement of Pareto efficiency, the p紅allel impossibility results can be established in 
* This chapter is based on Ohseto (l999b). 
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economic environments. Zhou (1 991b) , improving upon Hurwicz (1972) and Dasgupta‘ 
Hammond , and Maskin (1979) , shows that strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency 
imply dictatorship in two-agent pure exchange economies. Hurwicz and Walker (1990) 
prove that any strategy-proof mechanism is generically Pareto inefficient in a model that 
includes pure exchange economies with a transferable good. These results suggest that 
we should give up Pareto efficiency in order to construct reasonable strategy-proof 
mechanisms. Barbera and Jackson (1995) characterize the set of strategy-proof, 
anonymous, and non-bossy mechanisms in pure exchange economies. The class of such 
mechanisms is rather rich; moreover, those mechanisms fulfil satisfactory properties of 
coalitional strategy-proofness , envy-仕eeness (Foley , 1967), and individual rationality. 
Serizawa (1996, 1999) presents similar characterizations in economies with one private 
good and one public good. Their characterizations enable us to understand how inefficient 
strategy-proof mechanisms are. 
In economies with an indi visible good and money , it follows from a general result of 
Tadenuma and Thomson (1995) that there is no strategy-proof and envy-free 
mechanism.7 Although envy-freeness is a concept of equity, it implies Pareto efficiency in 
these economies (Svensson, 1983). It also follows from a general result of Holmstrりm
(1979) that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism in these economies. 
In this chapter we adopt individual rationality and equal compensation as mild 
requirements of equity , and demand monotonicity as a minimum requirement of 
efficiency. We will check in the next section that each axiom is strictly weaker than envyｭ
freeness , and these axioms together do not imply Pareto efficiency in these economies. 
First, we show that if a mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness, equal compensation, 
and demand monotonicity, then it satisfies the constant transfer properザ (the allocation of 
monetary transfer depends only on who receives the indivisible good). Second, we prove 
that any mechanism that satisfies our four axioms allocates the indivisible good to one of 
the pre-specified one or two agent(s) , and disregards preferences of agents other than the 
7 They establish a more general resu1t that any subcorrespondence of the envy-free coπespondence i 
manipulable in the sense of Hurwicz (1972). 
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pre-specified agent(s). When the set of potential consumers of the indivisible good 
consists of two agents (without loss of generality , we call them agents 1 and 2) , we 
construct two types of mechanisms: the decisive mechanisms and the unilaterally 
unanimous mechanisms. Decisiveness requires that agent 1 (agent 2 respectively) get the 
indivisible good if he wants it at the cost of a pre-specified level of compensation, and 
agent 2 (agent 1 respectively) get the indivisible good without compensation otherwise. 
Unilateral unanimity requires that agent 1 (agent 2 respect:ively) get the indivisible good if 
both agents want agent 1 (agent 2 respectively) to get it under a pre-specified monetary 
transfer, and agent 2 (agent 1 respectively) get the indivisible good without compensation 
otherwise. When the set of potential consumers consists of only one agent, we construct 
the dictatorial mechanisms: one of the agents always consumes the indivisible good 
without compensation. Finally, we provide the following characterization: a mechanism 
satisfies strategy-proofness , individual rationality , equal compensation, and demand 
monotonicity if and only if it is decisive, unilaterally unanimous, or dictatorial. This 
characterization enables us to understand that those mechanisms 紅e very inefficient. 
Moreover, those mechanisms have serious asymmetry (e.g. (i) the decisive mechanisms 
determine allocations on the basis of only one agent's preferences; and (i) the unilaterally 
unanimous mechanisms and the dictatorial mechanisms always gu紅antee one of the 
agents at least the utility level of having the indivisible good without compensation). In 
contrast to Barbera and Jackson (1995) , the presence of an indivisible good induces 
serious asymmetry in mechanisms. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we introduce notation and 
definitions. In Section 3.3 , we describe a fundamental structure of strategy-proof, 
individually rational, equally compensatory, and demand monotonic mechanisms. In 
Section 3.4, we provide a ful characterization of those mechanisms. In Section 3.5 , we 
summarize the results and state some remarks. 
3.2. Notation and Definitions 
Let N={ 1,…,n} (n~2) be the set of agents. Consider a single indivisible good and a 
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transferable good. The indivisible good can be assigned to only one agent. The 
transferable good, regarded as money , is used for compensation. The society must decide 
who consumes the indivisible good and how much compensation the other agents 
receive. A consumption bundle of agent i isa pむr (ti ， Xi)εRx {O, 1 }, where tiεR 
represents the net monetary transfer which agent i receives (if ti>O) or agent i pays (if 
ti<O) , and Xiε{0 ， 1} denotes agent i's consumption of the indivisible good. The set of 
feasible allocations is Z={ (t} ,... ,tn;x} ,... ， X n)εRnx {O ， l}nl ヱ ti=O and ヱ xi=l}. The set 
ieN ie 
of feasible transfer allocations is ZT = { (tl , .• ， tn)εRnl エ tj:=O}. 
ieN 
Each agent iεN has a preference on his consumption space Rx {O, 1 }.Let U be the set 
of al quasi-linear preferences which can be represented by a quasi-linear utility function 
Ui(ti ,Xj)=ti+Vi(Xj) , where O=Vj(O)<Vj( l)<+∞• 8 For each UjεU， let 入(Uj)=Vj (l )-Vj(O). We 
can interpret 入(Uj) as agent i's willingness to pay for the indivisible good, that is , 
Uj(tj ， O)=Uj(tj-入(Uj) ，1) for al tiεR. Notice that UiεU and UiεU are identical preferences if 
and only if 入(Ui)=入(Ui). A list u=(u} ,... ，U n)εun is called a preference profile. 
For each coalition C in N , let -C represent coalition N¥C. Let (玩c ，u-c) denote the 
preference profile whose i-th component is Ui if iεC and Uj if ie: C. When C= {i }, we 
simply denote (U{i}, U_{i}) by (Ui, U_j). 
A mechanism is a function f: Un• Z , which associates a feasible allocation with each 
preference profile. For each uεun ， we let f(U)=(t}(u) ,...,tn(U);Xl(U) ,...,xn(u)). Let ft and 
fi be functions such that for each uεun ， ft(u)=(t](u) ,...,tn(u)) and fi(u)= (ti(U) ,Xj(u)) , 
respectively. For each Uεu n ， let Cf(U)= {iεNI xi(u)=l} represent the consumer of the 
indivisible good, and NCf(U)={iεNI Xj(u)=O} represent the non-consumers of the 
indivisible good. Notice that #Cf(u)=l and #NCf(u)=n-l for each uεu n . Let Rf={iENI 
there exists some UεUn such that Cf(U)= {i} } denote the set of agents who have an 
oppo口unity to receive the indivisible good through the mechanism f. 
We think of the following four axioms as desiderata for mechanisms. 
This implies that the indivisible good is a "good" for al agent. This is not a restrictive assumption 
Lnce we present impossibility result 
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Definition 3.1. A mechanism f satisfies strategy-proofness if for al Uεun ， iεN ， 
and UjεU ， uj(fj(u))三Uj(fj(Uj ， U_ω. 
If a mechanism f does not satisfy strategy-proofness, then there exist some UεUn ， 
iεN ， and UjεU such that uj(fï(uj , U_j))>uj(fj(u)); thus we say that agent i can manipulate f 
at U Vla Uj. 
Definition 3.2. A mechanism f satisfies indiνidual rationαlity if for al Uεu n and 
iεN ， uj(fj(u))三Uj(O ， O).
Definition 3.3. A mechanism f satisfies equal compensation if for al UE Un and i, 
jεNCf(U) ， tj(u)=町 (U).
Definition 3.4. A mechanism f satisfies demand moηotonicity if for al u , Uεun 
such that 入(百j)>入(Uj) for iεCf(U) and 入(百j)三入(Uj) for al jE r、~Cf(U) ， Cf(U)=Cf(百). 
Strategy-proofness states that truthful revelation of preferences is a dominant strategy 
for each agent. lndividual rationality requires that al agents should end up no worse off 
than at the status quo. Equal compensation requires that the amount of monet紅y transfer 
should be the same for al non-consumers of the indivisible good. Demand monotonicity 
requires that an increase of the consumer's demand and non-increase of the nonｭ
consumers' demand should not change the consumer of the indivisible good. 
These four axioms are independent as shown in Examples 4.2 -4.5. Here we present 
simple examples which draw a clear distinction between strategy-proofness and demand 
monotonlclty. 
Example 3.1. Let n=3 and a mechanism f be such that for al Uεu3 ， if 入(U3)三 1 ， then 
Cf(u)={ 1} and ft(u)=(O ,O,O) , and if 入(u3)<I ， then Cf(u)={2} and ft(u)=(O ,O,O). Then , f 
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satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality , and equal compensation , but does not 
atisfy demand monotonicity. 
Example 3.2. Let n=2 and a mechanism f be such that for al uεu2 ， if 入(U l )三入(U 2) , 
then Cf(U)={ l} and ft(u)=(ü ,Ü) , and if 入(Ul)<入(U2 ) ， then Cf(u)={2} and ft( u)=(Ü,ü). 
Then, f satisfies demand monotonicity , individual rationality, and equal compensation , 
but does not satisfy strategy-proofness. 
Example 3.1 shows that strategy-proofness does not imply demand monotonicity 
under the requirements of individual rationality and equal compensation: to check that f 
violates demand monotonicity , it is sufficient to see that Cf(U)={ 1} when 
入(Ul)=入(U2)=入(u3)=1 ， and Cf(百)={2} when A(Ul)=2，入(i12)=入(U3 )=上. This mechanism 2 
depends only on agent 3's preferences and never a110cates the indivisible good to agent 3. 
However, it is possible to construct a mechanism which satisfies our axioms except 
demand monotonicity, which incorporates preferences of a1 agents , and which potentia11y 
a110cates the indivisible good to any agent (see Example 3.4). Example 3.2 proves that 
demand monotonicity does not imply strategy-proofness under the requirements of 
individual rationality and equal compensation: to check that f violates strategy-proofness, 
it is sufficient to see that Cf(U 1, U2)= { 1}and Cf(U 1 ，百2)={2} when 入(Ul)=入(U2)= 1, 
入(u2)=2. This example also satisfies Pareto efficiency defined below. A similar example 
that contains any number of agents wi11 be constructed in Example 3.7. 
We then discuss the relationships between our axioms (especially demand 
monotonicity and strategy-proofness) and Pareto efficiency. In this model, Pareto 
efficiency can be represented as fo11ows (see e.g. Mas-Colell , Whinston , and Green 
(1995), p. 862). A mechanism f satisfies Pareto el丹・ciency if for a1 uεu n ， 
Cf(u)cArgmax {入 (Uj)}. We prove that Pareto efficiency irnplies demand monotonicity , 
but not vice versa. 
Lemma 3.1. If α mechanism f sαtisfies Pαreto efficiency, then f sαtisfies demand 
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monotonlClty. 
Proof. Consider any Uεun . 1t follows from Pareto efficiency that Cf(U)= {i} implie 
入(Uj )三入(Uj) for alljお. Consider any uεun such that 入(百j ) >入( Uj ) for iεCf(U) and 
入(uj)壬入(Uj) for al jεNCf(U). 1t is clear that 入(百j)>入(Uj) for al j:;ti, and thus it follows 
from Pareto efficiency that Ct(百)={i}. Q.E.D. 
Example 3.3. Let n=2 and a mechanism f be such that: for al Uεu2 ， if 入(ul )~l ， then 
Cf(U)= { l}and ft(u)=( -1 ,1) , and if 入(u])<l ， then Cf(u)={2} and ft(u)=(O ,O). Then , f 
satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality , equal compensation, and demand 
monotonicity , but does not satisfy Pareto efficiency. 
Example 3.3 shows that demand monotonicity does not imply Pareto efficiency: to 
check that f violates Pareto efficiency, it is sufficient to see that Cf(U)={ 1} when 入(ul)=l ，
入(u2)=2. This example also proves the existence of the mechanism which satisfies our 
four axioms (it is a member of the decisive mechanisms which we will define in Section 
3.4). 
1t follows from a general result of Holmstrりm(1979) that there is no strategy-proof 
and Pareto efficient mechanism. Example 3.2 proves that Pareto efficiency does not imply 
strategy-proofness, and Example 3.3 proves that strategy-proofness does not imply 
Pareto efficiency. Therefore, strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency are independent. 
We finally discuss the relationships between our axioms and envy-freeness. A 
mechanism f satisfies envy-freeness if for al UεU and i, jεN ， uj(fj(u))三Uj(fj(u)). A 
general result of Tadenuma and Thomson (1995) implies the non-existence of strategyｭ
proof and envy-free mechanisms. 1t follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 in Tadenuma and 
Thomson (1995) that envy-freeness implies individual rationality. 1t is evident from the 
definitions that envy-仕eeness implies equal compensation. It follows from the fact that 
envy-freeness implies Pareto efficiency (Svensson , 1983) and Lemma 3.1 that envy-
freeness implies demand monotonicity. Therefore, our a氾oms except strategy-proofnes 
むe strictly weaker than envy-仕eeness. The relationships among our axioms , Pareto 
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efficiency , and en vy -freeness 紅e illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
3.3. Preliminary Results 
In this section we describe a fundamental structure of strategy-proof, individually 
rational , equally compensatory , and demand monotonic mechanisms. First, we prove that 
those mechanisms have some constancy relative to transfer allocations , that is , those 
mechanisms specify the s紅nepattem of transfer allocations whenever they allocate the 
indivisible good to the same agent. 
Atran砕r allocαtionβmction is a functionπ:N→ZT ， which associates a feasible 
transfer allocation with each consumer of the indivisible good. For each iεN ， we let 
π(i)=(π1 (i) ，...，πj(i)ぃ . ，1t山)) ， where πj(i) represents the amount of money which agent j 
receives when agent i consumes the indivisible good. Let I1 denote the set of trans_声r
αllocation functions. A mechanism f satisfies the consωnt tran砕rproperty relative to π 
ε 刀 ifffor al uεun ， [Cf(U)= {i} コ ft(u)=π(i)]. A mechanism f satisfies the co則的nt
tran牧rproperty if for someπεIT， f satisfies the constant transfer property relative toπ 
Theorem 3.1. If a mechαnismf satiぞfies strategy-proo_介less， eqLωl compensαtion， 
and demand monoωniciη， theηfsatiポes the constant trαn砕rproperty. 
To prove this theorem, we have prepared the following usefullemmas. 
Lemma 3.2. For any mechanism メ U=(Ui， U-i)ε un， and 五iε u， iff satiぞfies strategy-
proφless， fJu)=(tJu)， l)， αnd λ伝i)>λ(u ï)， then fJLh U-i)=:(tJu) , 1). 
Proof. Suppose toward contradiction that fi(Ui , U_i)=(t j(Ui , U-i) ,Xi(Ui , U-i))=t=(ti(U) , 1). If 
Xi(Uj , U_i)=O and tj(Uj , U_j)>tj(u)+入(Uj) ， then since ui(tj(u) ， l)=uj(tj(u)+入(Uj) ，O) ， agent i can 
manipulate f atU via Ui. If Xi(Ui , U_j)=O and ti(百j ， U_i)<tj(U)+入(Ui) ， then since 
Ui(ti(U) , 1 )=Ui(ti(U)+入(百j) ，O) ， agent i can manipulate f at(Uj, U-i) via Uj ・If Xj(百i ， u-i)=O ，
then it must hold that tj(u)+入(Uj)三tj(Uj ， U-i)三tj(U)+入(Uj) ， which contradicts 入(百j)>入(Ui). 
Hence , Xi(Ui , U_i)=1. It is clear that Xj(Uj , U_j)= 1 and tj(Uj , u_):;ttj(u) contradict strategy-
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proofness. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 3.3. For any mechanism メ u=(U i. U-i共 un ， and 玩iε u， if f satisfies strategy-
proofness, fd u)=( tJ u), 0)， αnd Â(Ui)>λ而i)， then fdui, u-iJ=:( tJ u) , 0). 
Proof. Suppose toward contradiction that fj (百j ， U_j)=(tj(百j ，U_j) ,xï(Uj , U_j));t(tj(u) ,O). If 
Xj(Uj , U_j)= 1 and tj(Uj , U_i)>tj(U)-入(Uj) ， then since Uj(tj(u) ， O)=Uj(tj(u)ー入(Uj) ， l) ， agent i can 
manipulate f atU via Uj. If Xj(Uj , U・i)=1 and tj(百j ， U_j)<tj(u)-λ(瓦j) ， then since 
百j(tj(u) ,O)=Uj (tj (u)ー入(Uj) ， l) ， agent i can manipulate f at(Uj , U_j) via Uj ・ If Xj(Uj ,u_j)=l , then 
it must hold that tj(u)ー入(Ui)三tj(Uj ， U_j)三tj(U)ー入(Uj) ， which contradicts 入(Uj)>入(百j). Hence , 
Xi(Uj , U_j)=O. It is clear that Xj(Uj , U_j)=O and tj(Uj , U_j)訓j(U) contradict str剖egy -proofness. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 3.4. Assume thαtα mechαnism f satisfies strαtegy-proofness， equαi 
compensαtioれ， αnddemαndmonotonicity. For αII u, uモ un such thαtλ(Ui)>入，(Ui)for 
iモ Cr(u) α:nd λ(五j)く入，(uj) for al jε NCr(u)， it holds thαt f( u) = f(u) . 
Proof. It follows from Lemma 3.2 that fj(u)=fj (百j ，u-J By equal compensation , it 
holds that f(u)=f(uj , U_j). Choose arbitrarily jεNCf(U). By demand monotonicity , it holds 
th瓜 Cf(百 {j ，j} ， U_{i ，j} )=Cf(U)={i}. It follows from Lemma 3.3 that fj(uj ， u_j)=ち (U{ j. } , U -{ j , }). 
By equal compensation, it holds that f(百j ， u_i)=f(u{j ,j}' u_{j ,j JI)' Repeat this argument 
successively to all kεNCf(U) with k;tj. Then, we have f(u):=f(百). Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Choose any u, Uεun such that Cf( U )=Cf(百). Consider 
五εu n such that 入(立i)>max{ 入(Uj) ，入(Uj)} for iεCf(U)=Cf(百) and 入(uj)<min {入(Uj) ，入(Uj)} 
for al jεNCf(U)=NCf(瓦). It follows from Lemma 3.4 that f(u)=f(? and f(u)=f(立). 
Hence, it holds that ft(u)=ft(百). This implies that f satisfies the constant transfer property. 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 3.1 puts a strong restriction on the structure of mechanisms , but no 
restriction on the choice of transfer allocation functions. The following lemmas provide 
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some necess紅yconditions on transfer a11ocation functions. 
Lemma 3.5. Assume that a mechanism f satiぞfies the constant transfer property 
relative ωπεrr. Iff satiポes individual rationality, then there exists iε Rf such that 
π(i)=(O，...， O). 
Proof. For each iεRf' there exists uεun such that Cf(U)= {i}. By individual 
rationality, it must hold that tj(u)=πj(i)~O for a1 jE NCf(U). By budget balance, 
tj(u)=1t j(i)三O. Therefore , 1t j(i)三o for al iεRf. Suppose toward contradiction that there is 
no agent kεRf such that 1tk(k)=O, that is ， πj(i)<O for a1 iεRf. Consider Uεu n such that 
孔(Uj)>1t j(i) for al iεRf. It fo11ows from individual rationalilty that tj(め=πj (i)ミー入(百i) for 
iεCf(u)cRf， which contradicts the construction of Uj ・ Q.E.D.
Lemma 3.6. Assume that a mechanism f satiφies the consωnt tran砕rproperty 
relative ωπεrr. Iff satiポes strategy-proofness, indi1ノidua l' rationality, equal 
compensation, and demand monotonicity, then there exist no two agents i, jE Rf such that 
π(i)= π(j)=(O，...， O). 
Proof. Let Rf= {iεRflπ(i)=(O，.. .,0) }. Assume, on the contrary , that there exist two 
agents i , jE Rf. Since i , jεRf， there exist u，百εun such that Cf(u)={i} and Cf(U)={j}. 
Consider Ûεun such that -入(立k)>1tk(k) for a1 kεRf\哀f and 入(û，)<min {入(u ，) ，入(U，)} for 
alllEN. Consider 百j ，句εU such that 入(江j)>入(Uj) and 入(句)>入(町). It fo11ows from 
Lemma 3.4 that f(ωu川1)刺)
fち収jメ]バ(百句j ， 立丘-j)=可(0 ，λ1り). We show that Cf( 古) isindeterminable. If Cf( 自)= {k} for some kE Rf¥ Rf, 
then tk(Û)=πk(k)ミー入(Ûk) by individual rationality , which contradicts the construction of 
ﾛk. If Cf(ﾛ)= {l} for some lε長f\{ i }, then since fj(û)=(O,O) , agent i can manipulate f at 立
via Uj. If Cf(ﾛ)= {i }, then since f j(Û)=(O,O) , agent j can manﾌlpulate f at ﾛ via Uj. 
Q.E.D. 
These lernmas show that there must be asymmetry in mechanisms , that is , there is only 
one agent who can consume the indivisible good without compensating the other agents. 
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3.4. Main Results 
In this section we provide a ful characterization of strategy-proof, individua11y rational , 
equa11y compensatory, and demand monotonic mechanisms. First, we show that those 
mechanisms have serious asymmetry , that is , the set of potential consumers of the 
indivisible good through the mechanisms consists of at most two agents. 
Theorem 3.2. lf a mechanism f sati宅fies strategy-proofJVless, indùノidual rationality, 
equal compensation, and demand monotonicity, then #Rr52. 
Proof. Assume , on the contrary , that #Rf~3. Without 10ss of generality , we assume 
that Rfコ{1 ,2 ,n}. It fo11ows from Theorem 3.1 that f satisfies the constant transfer 
property re1ati ve to someπεrr. It fo11ows from Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6 that there exists on1y 
one agent iεRf such thatπ(i)=(O，...， O). Without 10ss of generality , we assume that 
1t(n)=(O ,…,0). Hence ， π(i):;t (O，…，0) for a1 iεRf\{n}. By individual rationality and 
budget balance , 1tj(i)<O for a1 iεRf\{ n}. By equa1 compensation, 1tj(i)>O for a1 iεRf\{ n} 
and al1 j釘. Since Rρ{ 1,2} , there exist u, u'εu n such that Cf(U)={ 1} and Cf(U')= {2}. 
For al iεRf\ { n} , choose some 斗U such thatλ(町<min{λ(Uj) ム(u)} and -入(可)>πi(i). 
For al jε-Rfu{n} ， choose some 玩jεU such that 入(町)<min{ 入(Uj) ム(uj )}. Choose some 
Ûl , ﾛ2E U such that 入(立1)>入(UI) and λ(む)>入(u~). It fo11ows from Lemma 3.4 that 
f(u)=f(店 1 ，U-l) and f(u')=f(む， U-2). Hence , Cf(ﾛ 1 ，江 l)={1} and Cf(む，U-2)={2}. Choose 
some Ul , U2εU such thatπ1(2)ーπ1 (1)>入(Ul)>ーπ1(1) and 1t 2 (1)-1t2(2)>入(U2)>ー 1t2(2). The 
fo11owing steps lead to a contradiction (see Figure 3.2). 
Step 1. Cr (u l，瓦 1)={1}.
By individua1 rationality , ifCf(Ul ,U_l)={k} for any kεRjへ {l ，n }， then 
tk(江 1 ， U-I)=πk(k)三ー入(Uk) ， which contradicts the construction of Uk. Notice that 
UI(π1 (1)， 1)=U1(π1 (1)+入(U1) ， 0)>百 1 (O ,O)=Ul (π1 (n) ,O). If Cf(百 1 ，百-1)={n }， then agent 1 
can manipulate f at(百 1 ，百-1) via ﾛ 1 ・ Hence， we have that Cf(íU1 , U-l)= { 1 }. 
Step 2. Cr (u2， 瓦2)=(2).
By individual rationality , if Ct(U2 ,U-2)={k} for any kεRf\{2 ，n }， then 
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tk(U2 , U-2)=1tk(k)ミー入(Uk) ， which contradicts the construction of Uk. Notice that 
U2(π2(2) ， 1 )=U2(π2(2)+入(U2) ，O)>U 2(0 , O)=U 2 (π2(n) ， 0). If Cf(U2 ，百-2)={n }, then agent 2 
can manipulate f at(U2 ，百-2)via Û2 ・ Hence ， we have that Cf(U2 , U-2)= {2}. 
Step 3. j向{ 1 ， 2} ，瓦{ 1,2}) is indeterminable. 
By individual rationality , if Cf(U{ 1,2} ,U-{ 1,2})={k} for any kεRf\ { 1 ,2,n }, then 
tk(百{1 ,2} , U_ { 1,2} )=1'Ck(k)ミー入(Uk) ，which contradicts the const:ruction of Uk. Notice t:hat 
百 1(1'C 1 (2) ,0)=u 1 (π1 (2)-入(百 1) ， 1)>百 1 (π1 (1), 1) and 
U2(π2( 1 )， 0)=U2(π2(1)ーλ(百2) ， 1)>u2(π2(2) ， 1). If Cf(百{ 1,2} , u.{l ,2})= { 1}or {n }, then agent 
1 can manipulate f at(百 {1 ， 2} ，玩{1 ,2}) via U 1.If Cf(江{1 ,2} , U_ { 1,2})= {2 }, then agent 2 can 
manipulate f at(百ぃ，2} ，立 {1 ，2})via U2. Therefore , Cf(U {l,2} ,tl_{1 ,2}) is indeterminable. 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 3.2 is a tight result. We present mechanisms which satisfy any three axioms 
and the condition #Rf> 2. 
Example 3.4. Let πε I1 be such that 1'Cj(i)=O for al i, jE N. A mechanism f satisfies 
the constant transfer property relati ve toπ ， and for al uεU4 ， Cf(U) is defined as follows. 
入(U4)三 1 入(u4)<1
λ(U2)三 1 入(u2)<1 入(U2)三 1 入(u2)<1
入(U3)三 l 入(u 1)三 1 {4} {3} {4 } {3} 
入(u1)<1 {2} {2} {2} {2} 
入(u3)<1 入(Ul)三 1 { 1 } {3} { 1 } {3 } 
入(u1)< 1 { 1 } {4 } { 1 } {4 } 
Then , f satisfies strategy-proofness , individual rationality , equal compensation, and 
#Rf=n=4 , but does not satisfy demand monotonicity.9 
9 This example is suggested by Miki Kato. It is also possible to construct this type of mechanisms with 
more than four agent 
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Example 3.5. Let πεrr be such thatπj(i)=ー(n-i) for al iεN ， 1tj(i)=1 for al i, jεN 
with i<j , and πj(i)=Ü for al i, jεN with i>j. A mechanism f satisfies the constant transfer 
property relati ve toπ ， and for al uεun ， if 入(u j) >n-i for sorne iεN\{n} and 入(Uj)三n-j for 
alljεN with i>j , then Cf(u)={i }, and if 入(Uj)壬n-j for al jε I\r\ {n }， then Cf(u)={n}. Then, 
f satisfies strategy-proofness , individual rationality , demand monotonicity , and #Rf=n , 
but does not satisfy equal compensation. 
Example 3.6. Let πεrr be such thatπj(i)=ー (n-l) for al iεN and 1tj(i)= 1 for al i, j ε N 
with i:;tj. A mechanism f satisfies the constant transfer property relative toπ ， and for al 
uεun ， if 入(uj)>n for some iεM{n} and λ(Uj)三nfor al jεN with i>j , then Cf(u)={i }, and 
ifλ(Uj)三n for al jεM{n }， then Cf(u)={n}. Then, f satisfies strategy-proofness , equal 
compensation, demand monotonicity, and #Rf=n, but does not satisfy individual 
rationality . 
Example 3.7. Let a mechanism f be such that for al uεUn ， 
cdu)=Ipip{Mgm以{入(Uj)} }，刷
l陪eN
jεNCf(U). Then, f satisfies individual rationality , equal compensation, demand 
monotonicity , and #Rf=n, but does not satisfy strategy-proofness. 
The first three examples do not use information of preferences effectively. In Example 
3.4, each agent's preferences have no influence on whether or not he gets the indivisible 
good, and the configuration of transfer allocations. In Exarnples 3.5 and 3.6, the 
mechanisms determine allocations without incorporating agent n's preferences. In 
contrast, the last example uses preferences effectively and satisfies Pareto efficiency at the 
cost of strategy-proofness. 
Next, we characterize the set of mechanisms that satisfy strategy-proofness, individual 
rationality , equal compensation, demand monotonicity, and #RF2. We find again 
asymmetry in those mechanisms, that is , they determine allocations only on the basis of 
preferences of agents in Rf. 
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Lemma 3刀. If α mechanismf sαtisfies strαtegy-proofness， individuα1 rα tionaliη， 
equα1 compensαtion， demαnd monotonicity， α:nd #Rf =2, then f(u) =f(URr' U-Rr) for all u, 
瓦巳 un .
Proof. For simplicity of arguments , we assume Rf= { 1,2 }. Suppose toward 
contradiction that f(u):;tf(u{ 1 ,2} , u_{ 1,2}). It follows from Theorem 3.1 that f satisfies the 
constant transfer property relative to someπεn. Thus , Cf(U):;tCf(U{ 1 之} , u _ {1 ,2 } ). W i th 0 u t 
loss of generality, we assume that Cf(U)= { 1}and Cf(U{l ,2} , u_{1 ,2 })={2}. There exists 
some k (3~k~n) such that Cf(u {1 ，...， k} ，百ー {l ，...， k})={1} and 
Cf(U い ，...， k -l }, U_{ l ,.. .,k-l })={2}. It follows from individual rationality and Lemmas 3.5 
and 3.6 that either 1tl (1)<1t2(2)=0 orπ2(2)<1t l(1)=0. Consider the case of 
π1 (l)<1t2(2)=0. By equal compensation ， πk (l )>πk(2). Hence, agent k can manipulate f at
(U{ 1 ,...,k-l} , u_{ 1 ， ...，k ・ l}) via ub which contradicts strategy-proofness. The other case is 
similar. Q.E.D. 
We define two classes of mechanisms which depend only on preferences of potential 
consumers. 
Definition 3.5. A mechanism f isdecisiνe if (A1) Rf= {i ,j} for some i, jE N , (A2) f 
satisfies the constant transfer property relative to someπε I1 such thatπi (i)=-(n-1 )p<O , 
πk(i)=p>O for al k礼 and π ，u )=0 for alllεN ， and (A3) for al uεun ， [入(uj)>(n-1 )p コ
Cf(u)={ i}] and [入(uj)<(n-1 )p コ Cf(u)= {j } ] , w here p isa positi ve real n umber. 
Definition 3.6. A mechanism f isunilaterally unanimous if (B 1) R戸{ i,j} for some 
i, jE N , (B2) f satisfies the constant transfer property relative to someπε I1 such that 
πj (i)=ー(n-l)p<O ， 1tk(i)=p>O for al k:;ti, and 1tlU)=O for allIE=N , and (B3) for al uεUn ， 
[入(Uj)>(n-l )p 加d 入(Uj)<P コ Cf(u)={i}] and [入(uj)<(n-l)p or 入(Uj ) >P コ Cf( U ) = {j} ] ,
where p isa positive real number. 
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Here , P represents the amount of the transfer from agent i toeach of the other agent 
when agent i receives the indivisib1e good. (A1) and (B1) say that the set ofpotential 
consumers consists of two agents indexed by i and j. (A2) and (B2) say that the 
mechanism satisfies the constant transfer prope口y relative to some transfer allocation 
function in which agent i pays the equal 出nountof money to the other agents when he 
gets the indivisible good and agent j pays nothing when he gets it. (A3) says that agent i 
gets the indivisib1e good if agent i wants it under a given transfer allocation , and agent j 
gets the indivisible good otherwise. (B3) says that agent i gets the indivisib1e good if 
agent i wants it and agent j does not want it (hence, both agents want agent i toget it) 
under a given transfer allocation , and agent j gets the indivisible good otherwise. Figures 
3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the structure of the decisive mechanismls and the unilaterally 
unanimous mechanisms respectively. 
Lemma 3.8. 11 α mechanism 1 satislies strategy-proφless， individual rationality, 
equal compensation, demand monotonicity, and #Rr =2, then 1 isdecisi1ノe or unilαterally 
unαnlmous. 
Proof. Assuming that f isnot decisive , we show that f isunilaterally unanimous. (B 1) 
is trivial. (B2) is straightforward from Theorem 3.1 , Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, and equa1 
C叫ensation. W恥e叩叩p戸仰rove (仰倒B3). L凶et仰t印P= ず古了〔π爪州川附1バρ(iωi). N尚似ti附にC∞e
lゆ)ゆp ∞ u町i(伏π爪州lバ(ωiり)， 1り)=引u叫li(伏7πtiρ(i)+入川(似何ωu町ωli川i) ，冷刈O的)=u吋li以1バ(-(nト叶-1ゆ)冶p+は入(何Ui) ，冷O的)>刈u町li[川(ρO仏ω，ρ刈O的)=引u叫li(1t i (j) β)] ， and 
[入(Uj)>P ∞ Uj(πj (j)， 1)=uj(πj (j)+入(uj)， ü)=Uj(入(Uj) ， ü)>Uj(p ，ü)=Uj(πj( i) 冷)]. 
Step 1. For αlluε un such that λ(ui)<(n-1)p， Cr(u)={j). 
Assume , on the contrary, that Cf(u)={i}. By individual rationality , it must hold that 
tj(u)=πj (i)=-(n-l)pミー入(Uj). It contradicts 入(ui)<(n-1 )ρ 
Step 2. For αlluε un such that λ(u iJ >(n-1)p αnd λ(Uj)<P， Cr( u)= {i}. 
Since iεRf， there exists Uεu n such that Cf(u)={i}. For al UjεU such that 入(ui)>(n-
l)p , it must hold that Cf(Ui ,U-i)={i}; otherwise agent i can manipulate f at(Uj ,U_i) via Uj. 
For al Uj , UjεU such that 入(ui)>(n-1)p and 入(Uj)<P ， it must hold that 
Cf(U{j ,j} ,U_{j ,j} )={i}; otherwise agentj can manipulate f at(U{j ,j}, U_{j ,j}) via Uj. By Lemma 
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3.7, we obtain a desired conclusion. 
Step 3. For all uε un such that λ(u iJ三(n-l )p and λ(Ujかp， Cr(u)={j). 
Since f is not decisive, there exists ûεun ， where 入(立j)>(n- 1 ) p ， such that Cf(立)={j }. 
For al UjεU such thatλ(Uj )三(n-1)p ， it must hold that Cf( Uj ,íU_j )={j}; otherwise agent i 
can manipulate f at?via Uj. For al Uj , U町jε U such t出ha瓜t 入(何1u1h1 )》三三~ (卯nト-1り)P and 入川(U町1有j)>P ， it mus引t 
hold t出ha瓜t Cf如(れωu町川I円(れ仏ω1しj ，jル
By Lemma 3.ブ7 ， we have a desired conclusion. Q.E.D. 
The definition of the decisive mechanisms does not specify an allocation for al uε Un 
such that 入(Uj)=(n-1)p. Let UA={uεUnl 入(uj)=(n-1)p and 入(Uj)<P }, U B= {uε Unl 
入(Uj)=(n-l)p and 入(Uj)=P }， and Uc={uεUnl 入(Uj)=(n-l)p and 入(Uj)>P}. We use the 
notation Cf(U)={k} for some Ucun and kεN when Cf(u)={k} for al Uε U. We consider 
necessary conditions on allocations for preference profiles in UA, UB, and Uc ・ Ifthere 
exist u，面εUA such that Cf( u)= { i}and Cf(む)={j } , then by Uj=玩j and Lemma 3.7 , agent j 
can manipulate f atu via Uj. Hence, it must hold that either Cf(U A)= {i} or Cf(U A)= {j } . 
Similarly, it must hold that either Cf(Uc)={i} or Cf(Uc)={j}. It follows from Lemma 3.7 
that either Cf(U B)= {i} or Cf(U B)= {j }. We can find the following eight patterns for the 
specification of allocations for UA, UB, and Uc ・
[α 1] Cf(UA)={i }, Cf(UB)={i }, Cf(Uc)={i}. 
[α2] Cf(UA)={i }, Cf(UB)={i }, Cf(Uc)={j}. 
[α3] Cf(UA)={i }, Cf(UB)={j }, Cf(Uc)={j}. 
[α4] Cf(UA)={j }, Cf(UB)= {j}, Cf(Uc)={j}. 
[α5] Cf(U A)= {i }, Cf(U B)= {j}, Cf(UC) = {i}. 
[α6] Cf(UA)= {j}, Cf(UB)={i }, Cf(Uc)={i} 
[α7] Cf(UA)= {j}, Cf(UB)={i }, Cf(Uc)={j}. 
[α8] Cf(U A)= {j}, Cf(U B)= {j }, Cf(U c)= {i} . 
Similarly, the definition of the unilaterally unanimous mechanisms does not specify an 
allocation for al UεUn such that [入(U j)=(n-l )p and 入(uj)~p ].， and [入(u j)> (n-1 ) p and 
入(U j)= P ].Le t U D= { UεUn l 入(U j)>(n-l ) p and 入(Uj) =P}. We can find the following eight 
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pattems for the specification of allocations for UA, Us, and Uo・
[ﾟ 1] Cf(UA)={i }, Cf(Us) ={i }, Cf(Uo)={i}. 
[ﾟ2] Cf(U A)= { i }, Cf(U s)= {j }, Cf(U 0)= { i } . 
[ﾟ3] Cf(U A)= {i} , Cf(U s)= {j }, Cf(U 0)= {j } • 
[ﾟ4] Cf(U A)= {j}, Cf(U s)= {j }, Cf(U 0)= { i} .
[ﾟ5] Cf(U A)= {j}, Cf(U s)= {j }, Cf(U 0)= {j } • 
[ﾟ6] Cf(UA)={i }, Cf(Us)={i }, Cf(Uo)={j}. 
[ﾟ7] Cf(U A)= {j}, Cf(U s)= {i}, Cf(U 0)= {i } . 
[ﾟ8] Cf(U A)= {j}, Cf(U s)= {i }, Cf(U 0)= {j } • 
Theorem 3.3. A mechanism f satisfies strategy-proofness, indilノidual rationality, 
equal compensation, demand monoωnicity， and #Rf =2 ifand only if (i) f isdecisive with 
one of [α1} -[α4}， or (ii)fis unilaterally unanimous with one of [ﾟl) -[ﾟ5}. 
Proof. It follows from Lemma 3.8 that if f satisfies strategy-proofness , individual 
rationality, equal compensation, demand monotonicity, and #RF2, then f isdecisi ve or 
unilaterally unanimous. It is easy to show that if f isdecisive with one of [α5] -[α8 ]， 
then f violates strategy-proofness. Similarly, it is easy to show that if f isunilaterally 
unanimous with one of [ß6] ー [ß8 ]， then f violates strategy-proofness. This proves 
necessity. Straightforward proofs of sufficiency are omittedl. Q.E.D. 
Finally , we characterize the set of mechanisms that satisfy strategy-proofness , 
individual rationality, equal compensation, demand monotonicity, and #Rf= 1. We 
introduce the dictatorial mechanisms: there is an agent who always consumes the 
indivisible good without compensation to the other agents. 
Definition 3.7. A mechanism f isdictatorial if there is an agent iεN such that for al 
uεun ， f j (u)=(O, l) and fj(u)=(O ,O) for allj釘.
The following theorem is straightforward, and the proof will be omitted. 
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Theorem 3.4. A mechanism f satiぞfies strategy-proofness, individual ra tionaliη， 
equαl compensation, demand monotonicity, and #Rf =1 ifαnd only iff isdicfatorial. 
3.5. Conclusion 
1n the previous section we divided the set of mechanisms into three classes based on the 
number of potential consumers, and we characterized the set of strategy-proof, 
individually rational , equally compensatory, and demand monotonic mechanisms for each 
of the classes (Theorems 3.2 , 3.3 , and 3.4). 1t may be convenient to sum up those results 
as the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.5. A mechαnism f satisfies strategy-proφless， individual rationality, 
equal compensation， αnddemαnd monotonicity if and only if (i) f isdecisive with one of 
fα1] -[α4]， (i) f isunilαterally unanimous with one of [ﾟl} -[ß5}, or (ii) f isdictatorial. 
These t廿ee types of mechanisms have the following comrnon properties: (i) they 
determine the allocation of monetary transfer depending on who receives the indivisible 
good; (i) they allocate the indivisible good to one of the pre-specified (one or two) 
agent(s); and (ii) they disregard preferences of agents other than the pre-specified 
agent(s). 
1t follows from a general result of Tadenuma and Thomson (1995) that there is no 
strategy-proof and envy-free mechanism. Although our axioms of individual rationality , 
equal compensation, and demand monotonicity are strictly weaker than envy-freeness , it 
is impossible to construct attractive mechanisms wruch satisfy strategy-proofness , 
individual rationality , equal compensation, and demand monotonicity. This 
characterization shows that the presence of an indivisible good yields serious asymmetry 
in mechanism山
1t follows from a general result of Holmstrりm (1979) that there is no strategy-proof 
and Pareto efficient mechanism. However, it was not yet clear how inefficient strategy-
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proof mechanisms 訂e. This characterization enables us to understand that those 
mechanisms 紅e very inefficient. It is easy to see that any decisive mechanism, unilaterally 
unanimous mechanism, or dictatorial mechanism fails to achieve a Pareto efficient 
allocation for many preference profiles. 
|St附針Pr仙less I 
Individual Rationality 
Envy-Freeness Equal Compensation 
Pareto Efficiency Demand Monotonicity 
Figure 3.1. The relationships among six axioms. 
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Chapter 4 
Characterizations of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms 
** for Excludable versus Non-Excludable Public Projects 
4.1. Introduction 
We address the mechanism design problem for the provision of a fixed sized public 
project, that is , the provision of one indivisible unit of a non-rivalrous good. Some public 
projects 訂e non-excludable by nature. We first consider that case. The issue there is to 
decide whether to provide the project and how to divide the cost of producing it, if 
produced. Some public projects c如 bemade excludable by appropriate methods. Cable 
TV isan example. We next consider this possibility. Here the question is stil whether to 
provide the project and how to divide the cost of producing it, but also who is allowed to 
consume it. The main axiom we impose on mechanisms is strategy-proofness (Gibbard, 
1973; Satterthwaite, 1975). Strategy-proofness requires tha1t truthful revelation of 
preferences should be a dominant strategy for each agent. We also introduce four 
auxiliary axioms. Individual rationality requires that al agents should end up no worse 
off than at the status quo. Demand monotonicity requires that (i) the set of consumers of 
the project should not shrink when the demand of no agent decreases , and that (i) the set 
of consumers of the project should be unchanged when the 白mandofno cu汀ent
consumer decreases and the demand of no current non-consumer increases. Citizen 
sovereignty requires that society should have access to either level of the project. Acces 
independence requires that each agent should have access to either level of the project 
regardless of other agents' preferences. 
For the provision of non-excludable public goods , Serizawa (1996) characterizes the 
et of strategy-proof, individually rational , and "non-bossy" (Satterthwaite and 
H・ This chapter is based on Ohseto(] 999a). 
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Sonnenschein, 1981) mechanisms, which he calls "semiconvex cost sharing scheme 
determined by the minimum demand principle" .10 Those mechanisms are very far from 
being Pareto efficient since they divide the cost of producing the public good according to 
a fixed cost sharing rule. Non-bossiness substantially n訂rows down the class of 
strategy-proof mechanisms , and thus plays an important role in his characterization. 
However, this property stands on weak normative ground. Therefore, a characterization 
without non-bossiness is an important extension of his result. 
For the provision of non-excludable public goods , Moulin (1994) characterizes "the 
conservative equal-costs mechanism" by imposing coalitional strategy-proofness , 
individual rationality, and symmetry. For the provision of excludable public goods , he 
proves that "the serial mechanism" satisfies coalitional strategy-proofness, the stand alone 
test, and symmetry, and Pareto dominates the conservative equal-costs mechanism.1 
Coalitional strategy-proofness is very meaningful, but it is a stronger requirement than 
strategy-proofness and non-bossiness. It is an interesting question what class of 
mechanisms is characterized by strategy-proofness instead of coalitional strategy-
proofness.12 Moreover, we would like to know how the class of strategy-proof 
mechanisms enlarges if we drop symmetry. 
First, we consider the case of a non-excludable public project. We introduce the 
notions of "constant cost sharing" and "the unanimous mechanisms". Constant cost 
sharing pre-specifies a cost sharing pattern for society , and requires that if the project is 
provided, then agents should share its cost according to the cost sharing pattern. Serizawa 
10 Serizawa (1996) considers the case of the continuous provision , whe:reas we consider the case of the 
discrete provision. However, his result applies to the case of discrete provision as well. The sarne 
cornrnent applies to Moulin (1 994) , Saijo (1 991), and Serizawa (1999) discussed later 
ハ The stand alone test is stronger than individual rationality. Saijo (1991) proves that there is no 
rnechanisrn which satisfies strategy-proofness and the stand alone test for the provision of non-excludable 
public goods. 
12 Serizawa (1999) proves that the conservative equaトcosts rnechanisrn is the unique mechanism which 
atisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality , and symrne汀y for the provision of non-excludable 
public good 
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(1996) shows that constant cost sharing is a necess紅y condition for strategy-proofness in 
the two-agent case. We prove that constant cost sharing is a necesary condition for 
strategy-proofness and individual rationality in the n-agent case. The unanimou 
mechanisms are defined as follows: (i) they 紅e constant cost sharing; and (i) they 
provide the project if and only if each agent's willingness to pay is larger than or equal to 
his cost sh紅e. We characterize the unanimous mechanisms as the set of strategy-proof, 
individually rational , and citizen sovereign mechanisms. 
Second, we consider the case of an excludable public project. We introduce the 
notions of "semiconstant cost sharing" and "the largest unanimous mechanisms". 
Semiconstant cost sharing pre-speci白es a cost sharing pattern for each coalition, and 
requires that if the project is provided for agents in some coalition, then those agents 
should share its cost according to the cost sharing pattem for the coalition. We prove that 
semiconstant cost sharing is a necess紅y condition for strategy-proofness in the two-agent 
case, and it is a necess訂y condition for strategy-proofness, individual rationality , and 
demand monotonicity in the n-agent case. The largest unaniJmous mechanisms are defined 
as follows: (i) they are semiconstant cost sh紅ing; and (i) they provide the project for the 
largest coalition such that the willingness to pay of each meInber of the coalition is larger 
than or equal to his cost sh紅e. We characterize the largest unanimous mechanisms as the 
set of strategy-proof, individually rational , demand monotonic , and access independent 
mechanisms. 
Comparing the two classes of mechanisms , we conclude that admitting partial 
exclusion always improves efficiency , that is, it is always possible to construct some 
largest unanimous mechanism (for an exc1udable public project) which Pareto dominates 
a given unanimous mechanism (for a non-excludable public project). Moreover, the 
i紅gestunanimous mechanisms 紅e very attractive for their simplicity: (i) each agent ha 
only to report his willingness to pay; and (i) there exists a simple algorithm to calculate 
the final allocation. 
Before closing this section , we discuss the relationship between our results and the 
work of Deb and Razzolini (l 999a, 1999b). For the provision of an excludable public 
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project, they focus on a particular member of the 1紅gest unanimous mechanisms (which 
they call "the auction like mechanism" or "the serial cost sharing"), which divides the cost 
of the project among the consumers of the project equally. They characterize thi 
mechanism by strategy-proofness, individual rationality , sylmmetry, and some auxiliary 
axioms (日irectional non-bossiness" and "free entry" (1 999a); 、ppersemicontinuity" and 
"voluntariness" (1999b)). The comparison of their and our characterization results m叫匂S
it clear that symmetry substantially n紅rows down the class of strategy-proof 
mechanisms. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce notation and 
definitions. In Section 4.3 , we characterize the set of strategy-proof, individually rational , 
and citizen sovereign mechanisms for a non-excludable public project. In Section 4 .4, we 
characterize the set of strategy-proof, individually rational , demand monotonic, and 
access independent mechanisms for an excludable public project. In Section 4.5 , we 
discuss the validity of admitting p紅tial exclusion. 
4.2. Notation and Definitions 
Let N={ 1,…,n} (n2:2) be the set of agents. We consider the provision of a fixed sized 
public project, that is , there is one indivisible unit of a non-ri valrous good yε{0 ， 1}. The 
cost function c(y) is normalized in such a way that c(O)=O and c(1)=1. We assume that 
the public project is non-excludable in Section 4.3 and excludable in Section 4.4. 
The consumption space of agent iεN is the set ofpairs (Xj ,yj)ERx{O , l }, where Xj 
denotes his cost share and yj denotes his consumption of the project. The set of feasible 
allocations is Z={ Z=(Xl ,. • • ,xn;Yl ,.. • ,Yn)E R nx {O , 1 } nl ヱ xi==c(m停 yi) and Xj三o for al 
iεN}. The set of feasible cost shares is ?= {s=(s 1, • . • ， Sn)ε Rnl L si=l and Sj三o for al 
iεN} . 
Each agent iεN has a preference on his consumption space. We assume that 
preferences can be represented by a utility function Uj(Xi , yi). Each preference Uj is 
continuous and strictly decreasing in xi , strictly increasing in yi , and satisfies the 
following property: for al xiεR， there exist XiεR and 支iεRsuch that Uj(支j ，1 )=Uj(Xj ,O) 
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and Uj(支j ， 0)=Uj(Xj ， 1). Let U be the set of al such preferences. For each U jε U‘ let 入(U j)
denote agent i's willingness to pay at the status quo , that is , U j(入 (U j) ，1 )=U j(O,O). 13 A list 
U=(Ul , '" ，U n)εU n is called a preference profile. 
Let 2N be the set of al coalitions in N, where のε2N . For each coalition Cε2N\{ の， N} ，
let -C represent coalition N¥C. Let (uc, u-c) denote the preference profile whose i-th 
component is 百i if iεC and Uj if i~ C. For simplicity of notation , we write (百{i} , U_ { i}) a 
(u j , U_j) and (u { iル U-{i ，j}) as (U j,j ,U_j,-j)' 
A mechanism is a function f: Un• Z, which associates a feasible allocation with each 
preference profile. Given a mechanism f and a preference profile u, we write 
f(U)=(XJ(U) , . ..,Xn(U);Yl(U) ,.. .,Yn(u)) . We use the notation x(u)=(x](u) , ...,xn(U)) , 
y(U)=(Yl(U) ,...,Yn(u)) , and fj(u)=(Xj(u)ぷ(U)). For simplicity of notation , we abbreviate 
y(U)=(O,…,0) as y(u)=O and y(u)=( 1 ，.・.， 1) as y(u)=l 
For each UεUn ， let lf(u)={iεNI Yi(U)= 1} represent the set of users of the project. We 
cal agents in lf(u) the included agents , and agents in N¥lf(u) the excluded agents. 
We introduce three central axioms on mechanisms. 
Definition 4.1. A mechanism f satisfies strαtegy-proo_斤:leSS if for al UεUn ， iεN ， 
and UiεU ， uj(fj(u))三Uj(fj(Uj ，U_j). 
Definition 4.2. A mechanism f satisfies individual rationality if for al UεU n and 
iεN ， uj(fj(u))三Uj(O ， O) .
Definition 4.3. A mechanism f satisfies demand monotonicity if for al u，証εUn ，
(i) [入(百j)注入(Uj) for al iεN コ lf(百)コIf(U)] ， and 
(i) [入(Uj)芝川町) for al iElf(U) and 入(百j)三川町) for al j~ If(U) 二今 If(u)=If(百)]. 
Strategy-proofness requires that truthful revelation of preferences should be a 
13 The assumption that u1 is strictly increasing in yiimplies th at 入 (Ui)>O .
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dominant strategy for each agent. Individual rationality requires that al agents should end 
up no worse off than at the status quo. Demand monotonicity requires that (i) the set of 
included agents should not shrink when the demand of no agent decreases , and that (i) 
the set of included agents should be unchanged when the delmand of no included agent 
decreases and the demand of no excluded agent increases.14 
We introduce two axioms concerning access to the project. 
Definition 4.4. A mechanism f satisfies citizen soνereignty if there exist u，百εu n
such that y(u)=O and y(u)= 1. 
Definition 4.5. A mechanism f satisfies access independence if for each iεN ， there 
exist Ui ，百1εU such that for al U-iεu n - 1 ， Yi(Uj , U_j)=O and Yi(Uj , u・i)= 1.
Citizen sovereignty requires that society should have access to either level of the 
project. Access independence requires that each agent should have access to either level of 
the project regardless of other agents' preferences. It is clear that access independence is 
stronger than citizen sovereignty. 
We use Pareto dominance for welfare comparisons between two mechanisms. A 
mechanism f Pareto dominates another mechanism f if (i) for al uεu n and iεN ， 
ui(fi(u))三Uj(fi(U)) ， and (i) for some uεun and iεN ， uj(fi(u))>Ui(fi(u)). A mechanism f 
weakly Pαreto dominates another mechanism f if (i) holds. 
4.3. Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for a Non-Excludable Public Project 
In this section we consider mechanisms for the provision of a non-excludable public 
project satisfying the following non-excludability assumption. 
14 When we only consider the set of quasi-line訂 preferences ， the premise of the second part of demand 
monotonicity is the same as that of Maskin monotonicity (Maskin , 1999), but the conclusion of the 
econd part of demand monotonicity is strictly weaker than that of Maskin monotonicity. 
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Assumption 4.1. (Non-Excludability). Given a mechanism f, either y(u)=O or 
y(u)=1 for each uεun . 
Definition 4.6. Gi ven sε~ ， a mechanism f isconstant cost sharing relative to s if 
for al UE Un, [y(u)=O コ x(U)=(O，…，0)] and [y(u)=1 コ x(u)=s].
A mechanism is constant cost shαring if for some sε ム fis constant cost sharing 
relative to s. Constant cost sharing pre-speci自己s a feasible cost share for society. If a 
mechanism is constant cost sharing, then it is very far from being Pareto efficient. 
However, Serizawa (1996) proves that constant cost sharing is a necessary condition for 
strategy-proofness in the two-agent case. 
Theorem 4.1. (Serizawa, 1996). 1f N= (1,2), and a mechanism f satisfies strategy-
proofness, then f isconstant cost sharing. 
We prove that constant cost sharing is a necess但γcondit:ion for strategy-proofness 
and individual rationality in the n-agent case. 
Theorem 4.2. 1f a mechanism f satisfies strategy-proofness and indiìノidual
rationality, then f isconsωnt cost sharing. 
Proof. The argument consists of two steps. 
Step 1. For αlluεUn， iεN， and 瓦iε U， ify(u)=l and Â(Ui)<λ同i)， then f( U)=f(iii, U-i). 
Suppose that f j(u)t:f iCuj , U_j). Since y(江i ，U_j)= 1 contradicts strategy-proofness, 
fj (百j ，U_j)=(O,O). By individual rationality , Xj(u)三入(Uj). Since Xj(u)<入(百j) , 
百j(Xj(U) ，1 )>Uj(O,O) , and thus 百i(fj(u))>百j(fj(Uj ，U_j)) , which contradicts strategy-
proofness. Therefore , fj(u)=fj(uj , U_j). Suppose that x(u)t:x(百j ，U_j). Then , there exist 
j ， kεN U,kt: i) such that Xj(u)>Xj(Uj , U_j) and Xk(U)<Xk(Uj , U_j). Let Uj' UkεU be such that 
Xj(U)>入(Uj)>Xj(Uj ，U_j) and Xk(U)<入(Uk)<Xk(百j ，U_j). By strategy-proofness and individual 
rationality , y(Uj , U・j)=O and Y(Uj ,b U- i.-k)=O , and thus x(Uj' U_j)=(O ,…,0) and 
X(Ui .k, U-i ，・ k)=(O，…，0). By strategy-proofness , Y(Ub U・k)=1 and Y(Ui 小 U ・し _j)=1. Let 
Si=Xi(Ub U-k) 加d Ei=Xi(EiJ ， 11 ・i. -j). By strategy-proofness , ui(fi(Ub U-k))泊i(fi(Ui ‘ k ，U-i.-k)) 
叩d ui(fi (百j ， U_j))三ui(fi(Ui小 U_j ， _j)) ， and thus Uj(Sj , 1)三Uj(O ， O)之ulSj ，1). By strategy-
proofness，百i(fi (百 j .j , U -j, _ j) )三瓦j(fi (百j ， Uづ)) and 百j(fj(百i ， k ， U-i ， -k))三百j(fi(UbU-k)) , and thu 
ulSj ， l)三百j(O ， O)三百j(sj ， l). Since Uj and Uj 紅e strictly decreasing in agent i's cost share ‘ it 
follows that Sj=Sj ・ This implies that 入(Uj)=入(Ui) ， which is a contradiction. 
Step 2. f isconstant cost sharing. 
Suppose that there exist u，五εun such that y(u)=y(u)= 1 and x(u):;t=x(百). Let ﾛl εUbe 
such that 入(Û1)>入(U1) and 入(立1)>λ(玩1). By Step 1, f(u)=f(ÍÌ1,u_l) and f(u)=f(立 1 ， U-l). 
Applying this argument to the remaining agents successively, we have that 
f(û)=f(u)学f(u)=f(û) for some ûεUn ， which is a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
These theorems 訂e tight. Example 4.1 shows that strategy-proofness is necessary for 
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. Example 4.2 shows that individual rationality is indispensable for 
Theorem 4.2. 
Example 4.1. Let n=2 and a mechanism f be defined by 
f(u)=( 入(Ul) ，入(U2_)_; 1) for al uεUn such that 入(U1)+入(U2)三 1 ， and f(R)=(O ,O;O) 
入(Ul)+入(U2) 入(Ul)+入(U2)
otherwise. Then, f satisfies individual rationality , but is not constant cost sharing. 
Example 4.2. Let n=3 and a mechanism f be defined by f(u)=(上，~，0;1) for al uεu n 
3'3 
such that 入(U3)三 1 ， and f(u)=(~，上，0;1) otherwise. Then , f sat:isfies strategy-proofness , but 
3'3 
is not constant cost sharing. 
Next, we examine when the project is provided. Given UE: Un and sεム let
A(u ， s之)={iεNI 入(Uj)三Sj} denote the set of agents whose willingness to pαY is larger than 
or equal to their component of s, and A(u ， s ，>)={iεNI 入(Uj)>Sj} denote the set of agents 
whose willingness to pay is strictly larger than their component of s. 
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Definition 4.7. Given sεð ， a mechanism f respects the unαnll111り) relative to s if (i) 
f isconstant cost sharing relative to s, (i) for al Uεun ， [A(u ， s之):;tN コ y(U)=O] ， and (ii) 
for al Uεun ， [A(u ， s ，三)=N コ y(u)=l]. Given sεム amechanism f respects the weak 
unanlmlか relative to s i旺 (i) and (i) hold, and (ii)' for al Uεu n ， [A(u ， s ，>)=N コ
y(u)=l]. 
Unanimity relative to s says that the project is provided if and only if al agents 
approve the provision of the project coupled with the cost share s. We prove that the 
unanimous mechanisms are on the Pareto frontier of the set of strategy-proof, 
individually rational , and citizen sovereign mechanisms. 
Theorem 4.3. (i) If α mechanism f respects the unanimity relative ω some sε .1， then 
f satisfies strategy-proφless， individual rationality, and citizen sovereignty. 
(ii) σα mechanism f satiポes strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and citizen 
soνereignty， then f isweakly Pareto dominated by α unanimous mechanism f relative to 
some sε .1. 
Proof. (i) We show that f satisfies strategy司proofness. Let uεun ， iεN ， and UjεU. We 
consider the following three cases. If iεA(u ， s 之)， then fj(u)==(O ,O) and Uj(O ,O)>Uj(Sj , 1). 
If iεA(u ， s ，三)=N ， then fj(u)=(sj , l) and uj(sj ， l)三Uj(O ， O). If ﾌE= A(u ， s之):;tN ， then there 
exists jE N U釘) such that je: A(u ， s 之)， and thus fj(u)=fj(uj , U_j)=(O ,O). It follows that 
uj(fj(u))三Uj(fj(Uj ，U_j) in al cases. It is clear that f satisfies individual rationality and 
clt1zen soverelgnty. 
(i) The 紅gumentconsists of two steps. 
Step 1. f respects the weak unanimity relative to some sε L1. 
By Theorem 4.2, f isconstant cost sharing relative to some sεð. Suppose first that for 
omeuεun ， A(u ， s ，三 ):;tN and y(u)= 1. Let ie: A(u ， s 之). It is clear that f j(u)=(sj , l) and 
Uj(O ,O)>uj(sj , l) , which contradicts individual rationality. Suppose next that for some 
uεun ， A(u ,s,> )=N and y(u)=O. By citizen sovereignty , there exists Uεun such that 
y(U)= 1. Since f isconstant cost sharing relative to s, f何)=(s~1). By strategy-proofn邸内
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f) (u 1, U-l)=(S) , 1). Since f isconstant cost sharing relative to s, f(u 1, U-l )=(sJ). If the 
remaining agents change preferences from Uj to Uj successively , we have that f(u)=(s; 1), 
which is a contradiction. 
Step 2. f isweakly Pareto dominated by the unanimous mechaηism f relatiνe to s. 
By Step 1, f(u)=f(u) for al uεun such that A(u ， s之):;tN or A(u ,s,>)=N. Let uεun be 
such that A(u ， s之)=N and A(u ,s,> ):;tN. 1t follows that either f(u)=f(u)=(s; 1) or 
[f(u)=(s; 1) and f(u)=(O ,...,O;O)]. Since Uj(Sj , 1)三Uj(O ，O) for al iεN ， f weakly Pareto 
dominates f. Q.E.D. 
4.4. Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for an Excludable Public Project 
1n this section we consider mechanisms for the provision of an excludable public project. 
We introduce some definitions. A cost sharing rule is a func?n π: 2N\{ の}→ll ， which 
associates a feasible cost share with each possible set of users of the project. For each 
Cε2N\{ の}， let n:(C)=(πl(C) ，・..九l(C)) ， Let TI denote the set of cost sharing rules. 
Definition 4.8. Gi ven πεTI ， a mechanism f issemiconst，αnt cost sharing relative to π 
if for al uεun ， [1f(u)=の二今 x(u)=(O ，...， O)] and [1f(U)=C (:;t②)コ x(u)=π(C)].
A mechanism f issemiconstant cost sharing if for some 1tεTI ， f issemiconstant cost 
sharing relative toπ. Semiconstant cost sharing pre-specifies a feasible cost share for 
each possible set of users of the project. The number of possible feasible cost shares is 
equal to the number of possible coalitions. If a mechanism is semiconstant cost sharing , 
then it divides the cost of the project according to a finite set of feasible cost shares , and 
thus it fails to achieve Pareto efficiency. This structure is quite similar to that of 
mechanisms in Barbera and Jackson (1995). 
We prove that semiconstant cost sh紅ingis a necessary condition for strategyｭ
proofness in the two-agent case. 
Theorem 4.4. If N={1 ,2), and a mechanismf satiザïes strategy-proofness, then f is
semiconstant cost sharing. 
Proof. Suppose that there exist u，百εun such that If(U)=If(百) and x(u):;tx(u). Consider 
the following two cases. 
Case 1. If(U)=If(U)=N. 
Let f(U)=(Sl ,S2 ;1, 1) and f(U)=(Sl ,S2;1 ,1). Without loss of generality , assume that 
S I>Sl and S2<S2. Let Ûl , Û2εU be such that 入(Ûj)>Sj and 入(Û2)>S2. By strategy-
proofness , f 1 (五 I ， U2)=(Sl ， 1) and f1 (立 1 ， U2)=(言 1 ， 1) ， and thus by strategy-proofness , 
f(Ûl ,U2)=(Sj ,S2;1 ,0) and f(Ûl ,U2)=(Sl ,S2;1 ,1). By strategy-proofness , f2(Ul ,Û2)=(S2 , 1) 
and f2(Ul ,Û2)=(S2 , 1) , and thus by strategy-proofness , f(Uj ,tì2)=(Sj ,S2;1 ,1) and 
f(Ul ，む)=(S1, S2;0, 1). Since f(u 1, ﾛ2)=(S 1, S2; 1,1) and 入(Ûj)>s 1, by strategy-proofness , 
f j(Ûj ,Û2)=(Sl ,1). Since f(Ûl ， U2)=(互い s2;1 ， 1) and 入(立2)>S2 ， by strategy-proofness , 
f2(?1, Û2)=(S2 ,1). It follows from Sj >Sj that s 1 +S2>S) +s2=1 , which is a contradiction. 
Case 2. If(U)=If(U)= {i}. 
Without loss of generality , let i=l. Let f(U)=(S1 ,s2;1 ,0) and f(百)=(Sl ， S2;1 ， 0). Without 
loss of generality , assume that s j >言1 and S2<S2. Let ÛjεU be such that 入(立 1)>Sj ・ By
Case 1, f(Ûl ,U2)=(Sl ,S2;1 ,0). Let S2 , s2ER be such that U2(S2 , 1)=U2(S2 ,0) and 
面2(S2 ，1 )=U2(S2 ,0). Let Û2εU be such that Û2(S2-ε， 1)=む(S2 ，0) and Û2(S2-8 , 1)=む(S2 ， 0)
for someε， 8>0. By strategy-proofness , f2(Ul , Û2)=(S2 ,0). Since S2>S2三0 ，
f(百)， Û2)=(互い s2;1 ，0). By strategy-proofness , f)(Ûl ,Û2)=(Sl ,1) and f2 (古 1 ，Û2)=(S2 ,0). It 
follows from Sl>Sl thatsl+s2<Sl+S2=1 , which is a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
We prove that semiconstant cost sharing is a necessarγcondition for strategy-
proofness , individual rationality , and demand monotonicity in the n-agent case. 
τhωrem 4.5. If α mechanism f sαtisfies strαtegy-proofness， individual rationality, 
and demand monotonicity, then f issemiconstant cost sharing. 15 
15 It follows immediately from this theorem that ザ a mechanism f satisfies strategy-proofness, individual 
rationality, denzand monotoniciη， and syl7l nzetη， then f issenziconstant cost sharing relative to π乍刀 ，
","!here for each Cε 2N\(の} ， πNC)=上forall iεC， and rcf(C)=OforalljεC 
ICI 
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Proof. The argument consists of three steps. 
Step 1. For all uεUn， iεN， and 五iε U， if yJu}=l and Â(Ui}<λ(ui) ， then f(u}=/{而i，lLiY . 
By demand monotonicity , If(U)=lf(Uj , U_j). Suppose that x(u):;tx(Uj , U_j). By strategyｭ
proofness , Xj(u)=Xj(Uj , U_j). Then , there exists jεN (j釘) such that 0壬Xj(U)<Xj(百j ，U-i). Thi 
fact and individual rationality imply that jE If(亘j ，U_j) , and thus jεIf(U). Let UjεU be such 
that Xj(u)く入(Uj)<Xj(百j ，U-i). By strategy-proofness , fj(uj , U_j)=(Xj(u) , 1). By strategy-
proofness and individual rationality , fj(Ui ,j' U_i ,_j)=(O,O). Since 入(Ui)<入(Ui) ， this 
contradicts demand monotonicity. 
Step 2. For al uεUn， iεN， αnd 五iε U， ifyJu}=O and Â(Ui}>λほi}， thenf(u}=f(玩i，U-i}' 
The 紅gumentis very similar to that of Step 1. 
Step 3. f issemiconstant cost sharing. 
Suppose that there exist u，面εUn such that If(U)=lf(百) andl x(u):;tx(u). Let ?1 εUbe 
such that 入(Û1)>入(U1) and 入(古1)>入(瓦1)if 1εIf(U)=lf(玩)， and 入(立1)<入(U1) and 
λ(古1)<入(U1) otherwise. By Steps 1 and 2, f(u)=f(立 1 ，U-1) and f(u)=f(立 1 ，玩 1)' Applying 
this 紅gumentto the remaining agents successively, we have that f(立)=f(u ):;tf(玩)=f(û) for 
some GεUn ， which is a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
These theorems are tight. Example 4.1 shows that strategy-proofness is necessary for 
Theorems 4.4 and 4.5. Example 4.2 shows that individual rationality is necessary for 
Theorem 4.5. The next example shows that demand monotonicity is indispensable for 
Theorem 4.5. 
Example 4.3. Let n=3 and a mechanism f be defined by 
(i) f(u)=(~， ~，O ・ 1 ， 1 ，0) for al UE Un such that [入(Ul)>land 入(U2)~~] and 入(U3)ミ 1 ，3'3，~，~ ~ ~ / ~~~ -~~ -~ ~ ~ -_&& _&_-L'-'-1/-3 -~&- '-'-L/-3 
(i) f(u)=(O ,O,O;O,O,O) for al UεUn such that [λ(Ul)<上 or 入(U2)<~] and 入(U3)三 1 , 
3 
(ii) f(u)=(~， ~，O ・ 1 ， 1 ， 0) for al Uεun such that [入(Ul)三2._and λ(U2)~~] and λ(u3)<1 ， and 3'3'~'~'~'~ / ~-- ---~ - ------L'-'-1/-3 --'-'-":'/-3 
(iv) f(u)=(O ,O,O;O ,O,O) for al uεun such that [入(Ul)<Z or 入(U2)くよ] and 入(U3)<1. 
3 
Then, f satisfies strategy-proofness and individua1 rationality, but is not semiconstant cost 
haring. 
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Next , we examine when the project is provided and who are the users of the project. 
Given UεUrl ， πε I1， and Cε2N\{ ø }, let A(u ，1t: (C)之)={iεCI 入(Uj)三1t: j(C)} denote the set 
of αgents in coαlition C whose willingness to pα:y is lαrger thα:n or equαl to their cost shαre 
specified by π， and A(u ，π(C) ，>)={iεCI 入(Ui)>πi(C)} denote the set of agents in coalitiol1 
C whose willingness to pα:y is strictly lαrger thαn their cost shαre specified by π. 
Lemma 4.1. If α mechanism f satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, 
demand monotonicity， αnd access independence, then f issemiconstant cost sharing 
relative ω some πεrr ， αndforall uε un and Cε 2N\{Ø} , 
(i) [A(u， n(C) ，三炉C=今 fr(u炉C]， αnd
(ii) [A(u， n(C)， >)=C 二今 fr(u)-:::;)Cj.
Proof. By Theorem 4.5 , f issemiconstant cost sharing relative to someπε I1. 
(i) Suppose that there exist uεun and Cε2N\{ ②} such that A( u ，π(C)之):;tC and If(U)=C. 
There exists some iεC such that i~ A(u ，1t: (C)之) and fi(u)=(1t: j(C) , 1) , which contradicts 
individual rationality. 
(i) By access independence, there exists uεun such that If(百 )=C. Let iεC. Suppose first 
that 入(Ui)注入(uï). By demand monotonicity , If(百)=If(ui ，玩j). Suppose next that 
入(Ui)<À(Ui). Since fi(U)=(πj(C) ， l) and 入(Ui)>πj(C) ， by strategy-proofness , 
f j(Ui ,U_i)=(1t: i(C) , l). Since iElf(uj ,u_i) and 入(Ui)<入(Uj) ， by demand monotonicity , 
If(U)=If(Uj , U_j). Hence, If(Uj , U_i)=C in both cases. Applying this argument to al iεC 
successively, we have that If(uc,u-c)=C. Let C=Cu{i~CI 入(Ui)<入(百i)}' By demand 
monotonicity, If(uc', u_c')=C. Since 入(Uj)注入(Ui) for al i~ C , by demand monotonicity , 
If(U)コC. Q.E.D. 
We now introduce two additional conditions on cost sharing rules. A cost sharing rule 
πis user monotonic i百 for al C , Cε2N\{ の} such that CコC ， πi(C)三1t: j(C) for al iεC.A 
cost sharing rule πis user liable if for al Cε2N\{ の}， 1t:i (C)>?for al iεC andπj(C)=ü 
for al j~ C. User monotonicity requires that the share of the cost of the included agent 
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should not increase when the set of included agents expands.16 U ser liability requires that 
the included agents should pay something and the excluded agents should pay nothing.17 
Let n denote the set of user monotonic and user liable cost sharing rules. We show that 
user monotonicity and user liability 訂enecessary conditions for strategy-proof, 
individually rational , demand monotonic, and access independent mechanisms. 
Lemma 4.2. {σf α mη'lechα仰nl臼smη'l fsaαti毛析f戸zes straαtegy-proofnれ'less， indilν川ノJidωuαal raαtionαalμitηy心' 
demand monoωnicity， and access independence, then f issefniconstαnt cost sharing 
* relαtive to some user monotonic and user liable cost sharing rule πε 刀.
Proof. By Theorem 4.5 , f isserniconstant cost sharing relative to someπεn. First, 
we show thatπis user monotonic. Suppose that there exist C, Cε2N\{ ②} such that Cコ亡
and 1tj(C)>1tj(C) for some jεC. By access independence , there exists uεU n such that 
If(u)=C. For al iεC， let 百iεUbe such that 入(百j)三入(Uj) and 入(百j)>πj(C). Let u=(uc , u-c). 
By demand monotonicity , If(u)=C. Hence , ~町j(何U)=(ο伏7π州t
π州jバ(♂向C)>沈入(印G向匂j)>河πj(♂め亡。). S臼ln附C印eAκ((向G いj，バ，u_百江-j) ，スπ(めε。)，>川，ム刈>刈)=Cξう， b句y Lemma 4.1 , If爪(瓜向G向J'瓦百江-j炉)~コC. Hence , 
jεIf(立j ，u_j). By strategy-proofness , fj(立j ，百ォ )=(πj(C) ， 1), which contradicts individual 
rationality . 
Next, we show thatπis user liable. Let Cε2N\{ の}. By access independence, there 
exists uεUn such that If(u)=C. By individual rationality , 1tj(C)=Xj(u)=O for al i~C. 
Suppose thatπj (N)=O for some jεN. By access independence, there exists uεUn such 
that If(u)=N¥{j}. For al iεN\ {j}, let UjεU be such thatλ(百j)三入(Uj) and 入(Uj)>πj(N). By 
demand monotonicity, If( Uj' U_j)=N¥ {j}. Since λ(Uj)>1tj(N)=ü ， A((uj , U_j) ，π(N) ，>)=N. By 
Lemma 4.1 , If(uj , u_j)=N, which is a contradiction. Hence, 1cj(N)>O for al iεN. Since π 
is user monotonic , 1t j(C)~1t j(N)>O for al Cε2N\{ の} and iεC. Q.E.D. 
16 The idea of user monotonicity is much the same as that of "population monotonicity" introduced under 
a diferent name by Thomson (l 983a, 1983b) in the context ofbargaining. 
17 The notion of user liability is technicaly the same as that of "strong individual rationality" introduced 
by Roth (1977) in the context of bargaining. However, the meaning is somewhat diferent since we 
consider here the cost sharing problem. 
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Next, we identify the largest coalition whose members at a given preference profile 
approve the provision of the project coupled with the pre-specified cost sharing rule. A 
coalition Cε2N\{ の} is the largest unanimous coalition at uε []fl relative ωπεI7* iff(i) 
A(u ，π(C)之)=C ， and (i) A(u，1t(亡)之)7:C for al Cε2N\{ の} such that CコC and C7:C. The 
largest unanimous coalition is unique if it exists. To check this , suppose that there exist 
two largest unanimous coalitions C and C at uεU n relati ve toπεrr . N otice that CctC and 
CctC. Since πis user monotonic , 1t j(C)三πj(CuC) for al iεC and 1t i(C)~1ti(CUC) for al 
iεC. Since A(u，π(C)之)=C and A(u，1t (C) 之)=C，入(Ui)三πj(CuC) for al iεCuC. Hence , 
A(u ，π(CuC) 之)=Cし，C ， which is a contradiction. 
Definition 4.9. Given πεrr , a mechanism f respects the largest unan?ity relative 
to πiff (i) f issemiconstant cost sharing relative toπ ， (i) for al uεun ， if there is no 
largest unanimous coalition at u relative toπ ， then If(U)=の， and (ii) for al uεun ， if C is 
the largest unanimous coalition at u relative toπ ， then If(U)=C. Given πε 日， a 
mechanism f respects the weakly largest unanimity relative ωπi百 (i) and (i) hold , and 
(?)' for al uεu n ， if C is the largest unanimous coalition at u relative toπ ， then If(u)cC 
and [A(u ，π(C)ム)=C コ If(u)=C]. 
Largest unanimity relative toπsays that the project is provided for the largest coalition 
whose members approve the provision of the project coupled with the cost share specified 
by π ， and the project is not provided if no such coalition exists. The largest unanimous 
mechanisms 紅e simple in two respects: (i) they need litle information, that is , each agent 
has only to report a positive real number 入(Ui); and (i) there exists a simple algorithm to 
implement them. We prove that the largest unanimous mechanisms むe on the Pareto 
frontier of the set of strategy-proof, individually rational , delnand monotonic , and access 
independent mechanisms.1 
18 Deb and Razzolini (l 999a, 1999b) focus on the largest unanimous mechanism relative toπ%日 *
otice that 百leorem 4.6 and Footnote 15 lead to an alternative characterization of that mechanism 
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Theorem 4.6. (i) lfα mechαnism f respects the largest unanimity relative to S017le 
πε刀 ， then f satisfies strategy-proofness, indiνidual rationality, demand mono toniciη， 
αnd access independence. 
(i) If a mechanismf satisfies strategy-proo_丹'leSS， indiνidual rationality, demand 
monotonicity, and access independence, then f isweakly Pareto dominated by a 1αrgest 
* unanimous mechanism f relative to some πε II. 
Proof. (i) First, we show that f satisfies strategy-proofness. Suppose that there exist 
uεun ， iεN ， and UjεU such that uj(fi(uj , U_j))>ui(fj(u)). Let C=If(U) and C=IfCUj , U-i). Let 
iεC and iεC. Since πis user monotonic, CctC. Since πis user monotonic , 
A(u ，π(C)之)=C and A((uj , U-i) ，n: (C) 之)=C imply that A(u ，π(CuC) 之)=CuC. This 
contradicts the fact that C is the largest unanimous coalition at u relative toπ. Similarly, 
the case of i(l C and iE C leads to a contradiction. Let iεC and i(lC. Since A(u ， n: (C) ，三)=C ，
Uj(πj(C) ， l)三Uj(O ， O). Hence , uj(fj(u))三Uj(fj (百j ，U_j)) , which is a contradiction. Let i(l C and 
i(l C. Hence, fi(u)=fi(Ui , U_j)=(O,O) , which is a contradiction. 
Next, we show that f satisfies demand monotonicity. Let u，百εUn be such that 
入(百i)三入(Uj) for al iεN. Let C=If(U) and C=If(U). Since A(u，n: (C)之)=C implies that 
A(u， π(C)之)=C ， it follows that CcC. Let u, Uεun be such that 入(Uj)三入(Uj) for al iεIf(u) 
and 入(Uj)三入(Uj) for al j(l If(U). Let C=If(U) and C=If(U). Since A(u ，π(C)之)=C implies 
that A(u， π(C)之)=C ， it follows that CcC. Suppose that C:;tC. Since πis user monotonic , 
A(u ，n:(C)之)=C and A(U， π(C) 之)=C imply that A(u，π(C) 之)=C. Therefore , If(U)コC ，
which is a contradiction. 
It is clear that f satisfies individual rationality and access independence. 
(i) The argument consists of two steps. 
Step 1. f respects the weakly largest unanimity relatiνe to some πε II. 
By Lemma 4.2 , f issemiconstant cost sharing relative to someπεn . Suppose that 
there is no largest unanimous coalition at u relative toπ. By Lemma 4.1 , If(U):;tC for al 
Cε2N\{ の}. Hence, I f(U )=の. Suppose that C is the largest unanimous coalition at u 
relative toπSince πis user monotonic , A(u ，π (C) 之):;tC for al Cε2N\{ の} such that 
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ξctC. By Lemma 4.1 , If(u):;tC for al Cε2N\{ の} such that C1CZC. Hence , If(u)cC. 
Suppose that C is the largest unanimous coalition at U relative toπ ， and A(u ，π (C ) ，> ) =C. 
By Lemma 4.1 , If(u)コC. Hence, If(u)=C. 
Step 2. f isweakly Pareto dominated by the largest unanimous mechanism f relative to 
π. 
Letuεu n be such that C isthe largest unanimous coalition at u relative toπ ， and 
A(u ，π(C) ，> )学C. Therefore, If( u )=CコIf(u). Since πis user nlonotonic , uj(fj(u))三uj(fj(u))
for al iElf(u). Then , fi(u)=(πj(C) ， 1) and fi(u)=(O ,O) for al iE C¥If(U). Since 
A(u ，π(C)之)=C ， uj(fj(u))三uj(fj(u)) for al iε C\If(U). It is clear that f j{u)=fi(u)=(O ,O) for 
al i~ C. Hence, uj(fj(u))三uj(fj(u)) for al iεN. It follows froil the definitions of the 
mechanisms that f( u )=f( u) for al other uεun . Therefore, f weakly Pareto dominates f. 
Q.E.D. 
Finally, we explain how to find the largest unanimous coalition at uεU n relati ve to 
πε 日*.Suppose that A(u，Tt(C)之):;tCfor some Cε2N\{ の}. Let Cε2N\{ の} be such that 
CcC. Since πis user monotonic, ifπ(C) is rejected by some iεC， then π(C) is also 
rejected by iεC. Hence , A(u，1t (C) 之)=Cimplies that CcA(u ，π(C) 之). With this 
observation, we present the following algorithm which implements the largest unanimous 
mechanisms. 
Algorithm 4.1. The foliowing α19orithm implements the largest unanimous 
* mechα:nismfrelαtive to 冗モロ.
Step 0: Collect uモ un
Step 1: Let C=N. 
Step 2: 1f A(u， n(C) ，三)=C， then go to Step 5. 
Step 3: If A(u， n(C)，三)=の， then go to Step 6. 
Step 4: Let C=A( u, n( C)之)αndgo to Step 2. 
Step 5: Ir(u)=C αれd x(u)= π(C); end. 
Step 6: Ir(u)=の αnd x(u)=(O,… ,0); end. 
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4.5. Conclusion 
We characterized two classes of strategy-proof mechanisms for the provision of a fixed 
sized public p問ect. Partial excludability of the project led us to the set of largest 
unanimous mechanisms , whereas the non-excludability of the project led us to only the 
set of unanimous mechanisms. We compare these two classes of mechanisms , and justify 
P紅tial exclusion for the design of strategy-proof mechanisms. The following remark 
formally states that the largest unanimous mechanisms perfOIID better than the unanimous 
mechanisms from the point of view of efficiency. 
Remark 4.1. The largest unanimous mechαnism f relative to πε II Pareto dominates 
the unanimous mechanism f relati1ノeto sε ，1， where π(N)=s. 
Chapter 5 
Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Public Good Economies 
5.1. Introduction 
When a society provides public goods, it has to determine the level of public goods to 
produce and how to di vide the costs among agents. A mechanism is a function that 
describes the decision-making based on preferences of agents. Moulin (1994) 
ch訂acterizes "the conservative equal-costs mechanism" by coalitional strategy-proofness , 
individual rationality , and symme町y in economies with one private good and one public 
good. His result relies on the assumption that public goods can be produced without fixed 
costs. It is more natural , however, to assume that we need positive fixed costs to produce 
public goods. In this chapter we incorporate the consideration of fixed costs , and present 
not only positive results but also negative results. These results shed light on the 
boundary between possibility results and impossibility results. 
We study mechanisms that satisfy two basic axioms. The first axiom is strategy-
proofness. A mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness if it is a dominant strategy for each 
agent to reveal preferences truthfully. Moulin's result is quite appealing, because it is well 
known that strategy-proofness is a strong requirement in geIleral environments. The 
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) establish that, under 
minor conditions , any strategy-proof mechanism must be dictatorial. Recently , Barbera 
and Peleg (1990) and Zhou (1991 a) prove similar powerful impossibility results. The 
second axiom is individual rationality. A mechanism satisfies individual rationality if al 
agents end up no worse off than at the status quo. No agent lacks an incentive to 
participate in individually rational mechanisms. We characterize the set of strategy-proof 
and individually rational mechanisms in more natural econorrnc environments. 
材料 This chapter is based on Ohseto (1997). 
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We introduce the notion of a cost sharing rule , which associates a cost sharing pattern 
with each level of public goods. Assuming that cost sharing rules are exogenously given 
we consider mechanisms that determine the level of public goods. One interpretation of 
this setting is that the revision of tax rules is less frequent than public decisions. 
Moreover, the set of cost sharing rules we deal with is restricted to a reasonable one. That 
is , we require that cost sh紅ingrules have the same properties (continuity , convexity , 
etc.) as the cost function. The equal cost sharing rule (the costs 紅e divided among agents 
equally) and proportional cost sh紅ingrules (the costs 紅e divided among agents 
according to a given proportion vector) are examples of this set. 
First, for the sake of comparison , we consider the case of a cost function with no fixed 
costs. In economies with one private good and one public good , we show that the 
minimal provision mechanism is the unique mechanism satisfying strategy-proofness, 
individual rationality, and the full-range property for any cost sharing rule. The full-range 
property is the condition that any feasible level of the public good is attainable by the 
mechanism. If we turn our attention to the case of one private good and several public 
goods , the result drastically changes. That is , it follows frorn a general result of Zhou 
(l991a) that there is no strategy-proof and individually rational mechanism. 
Next, we consider the case of a cost function with positive fixed costs. Since the cost 
function has fixed costs, the cost function has the non-convexity. Thus , any cost sharing 
rule must have the non-convexity. We present the set of strategy-proof and individually 
rational mechanisms by restricting the range of mechanisms to recover the convexity of 
the cost sharing rule. Those mechanisms are the variants of the rninimal provision 
mechanism. Conversely, if the restriction of the range is not sufficient to recover the 
convexity of the cost sharing rule, the non-convexity prevents us from constructing 
trategy-proof and individually rational mechanisms. These results imply that we must 
restrict the range of mechanisms if we want to design strategy-proof and individually 
rational mechanisms. In other words , the non-convexity of cost sharing rules lirnits the 
variety of our choices , and therefore it is less desirable in terms of efficiency. These 
results also describe the boundary between possibility results and impossibility results ・
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To conclude this section, we relate our results to recent work on the characterization of 
strategy-proof mechanisms in public good economies. Barbera and Jackson (1994) 
present a full characterization of strategy-proof mechanisms. Their work does not specify 
the cost function explicitly, and does not apply to the case of a cost function with positive 
fixed costs. Serizawa (1996) characterizes the set of strategy-proof, individually rational , 
and non-bossy mechanisms in economies with one private good and one public good. 
Since the economic interpretation of non-bossiness is not so clear, we do not invoke on 
this condition. Serizawa (1999) characterizes the set of strategy-proof, individually 
rational , and symrnetric mechanisms in economies with one private good and one public 
good. His characterization is a refinement of Moulin (1994) since it identifies the 
conservative equal-costs mechanism by using strategy-proofness instead of coalitional 
strategy-proofness. Applying his results to the case of non-convex cost functions leads to 
impossibility results , which are closely related to our impossibility results. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 , we introduce notation and 
definitions. In Section 5.3 , we consider the case without fixed costs. 1n Section 5 .4, we 
study the case with fixed costs. In Section 5.5 , we sumrnarize the results. 
5.2. Notation and Definitions 
Let N={ 1,…,n} (n~2) be the set of agents. There are two types of goods x and y , where 
x isa (one-dimensional) private good and y=(Yl ,... ,Ym) is an m-dimensional vector of 
public goods. Public good i can be produced at any level yi in Yi=[O ,Yi max]. The capacity 
yi max is finite for al i. Let Y=I1 Yi ・ 19 A cost function of public goods is given by 
C(Yl ,... ,ym). We assume that c(O ,...,O)=O , C(Yl ,... ,ym) is continuous and convex on Y 
except at the origin (0,…,0) , and C(Yl ,... ,Ym) is strictly increasing in each yi. Let X=R+ 
denote the possible range of the costs. 
19 The assumption that the space of public goods is a Cartesian produclt is made for simp1icity. We only 
use the convexity of that space in Theorems 5.2 and 5.6. When agents have a limit of their cost share , the 
et of possible combinations of public goods has the convexity in this model , and thus theorems stil 
hold in this case. 
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A consumption bundle of agent iεN is (y 1,... ，ym~Xi) ， whe:re Xi is agent i's share of the 
costs of producing y=(y J,... ,Ym) units of public goods. Each agent iεN has a preference 
on YxX , which can be represented by a utility function ui. For each agent , let U denote 
the set of possible preferences , which consists of al continuous , strictly convex and 
monotonic (non-decreasing in y J,... ,Ym and non-increasing in Xi) preferences on YxX. 
Given any uiεU and any set BcYxX, Argmax(ui~B) denotes the set of maximal 
consumption bundles of ui on B. If Argmax(ui~B) consists o:f a single consumption 
bundle , we use argmax(ui~B) to represent the unique member of this set. A list 
u=(u J , . • • ,Un)E Un is called a preference profile. Given 民Un ， i, jεN ， UiEU , and 向εU ，
we denote by (Ui , U-i) the preference profile obtained from u after the replacement of uiby 
Ui , and by (百i ，ûj , U-i ,-j) the preference profile obtained from U after the replacement of ui 
and Uj by 百i and 向
A cost sharingルnctionfor agent i isa function πi: Y→X， which associates agent i's 
share of the costs with each level of public goods. A list π=(π ぃ... ，πn) is called a cost 
sharing rule. 
Definition 5.1. For any cost function c , a cost sharing rule π=(1t i)i E N isfeωible if 
for al YεY，エ πi(y)=C(y).
iEN 
For any cost function c, let I1c denote the set offeasible cost sharing rules. 
咽­? ??D
且
???? c(y) (1) For any cost function c, the equal cost sharing rule ， πl(y)=-「 for
al iεN ， is feasible. 
(2) For any cost function c, any proportional cost sharing rule ， πi(y)=PiC(y) where Pi>O 
for al iεN and L Pi= 1, is feasible. 
iEN 
Given anyπε I1c ， the set of feasible allocations is Zπ={ (y:;x 1,... ,xn)1 yεY and Xi=1ti(y) 
for al iεN} ， and the set of feasible consumption bundles of agent i (that is , agent i's 
consumption space) is Zf= { (y~xi)1 yE Y and Xi=πi(y)} . 
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Given anyπεTIc ， a mechαnism is a function fIT: Un→Zπ， which associates a feasible 
allocation with each preference profile. The range of fIT is denoted by R(fIT). Let #R(fIT) 
and dim(R(fIT) denote the cardinality and the dimension of the projection of R(fIT) on Y, 
respectively. Let f be a function corresponding to fIT that associates a feasible 
consumption bundle of agent i with each preference profile. The range of f is denoted by 
R(ff) . 
The notion of cost sharing rules is found in Mas-Colell (1980) and Mas-Colell and 
Silvestre (1989). They define the concept of cost share equilibrium as a unanimously 
preferred allocation suppo口edby some cost sharing rule. Although any cost share 
equilibrium is Pareto efficient, there is no cost share equilibrium on some fixed Zπfor 
most preference profiles. Hence, any mechanism fIT usually fails to achieve Pareto 
efficiency. 
We introduce two main axioms. 
Definition 5.2. A mechanism fIT satisfies strategy-proofness if for al uεUn ， iεN ， 
and UjεU ， Uj(tf(u))三Uj(ff(Uj ，U_j). 
Strategy-proofness states that truthful revelation of preferences is a dominant strategy 
for each agent. If a mechanism fIT does not satisfy strategy-proofness, then there exist 
some uεu n ， iεN ， and 百iεU such that Uj(tf(百j ，U_j))>Uj(tf(u)) , and therefore we say that 
agent i can manipulate fIT at u via 百j.
Definition 5.3. A mechanism fIT satisfies individual rationality if for al uεu n and 
iεN ， uj(ff(u))三Uj(O ，...， O;O).
Individual rationality requires that al agents should end up no worse off than at the 
status quo. 
The following lemma is useful in the subsequent sections. 
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Lemma 5.1. (Barbera and Peleg , 1990; Zhou, 1991 a). Gルen any cost sharing rlle 
πε 口。すα mechanism flt satisfies strαtegy-proofness， (y; π(y))モ R(fπ)and 
(y，' πJy)) =αrgm以，(ui;R(filt) for αlli モ N， then flt( u)=(y; π(y)). 
Proof. Since (y;1t(y))εR( fIT), we can choose uεun such t.hat fIT(百)=(y ;π(y )). Suppose 
toward contradiction that fIT(u):;t (y;π(y)). Let zí=fIT(Ul ,.. .，Uj ， llj+l ，'"瓦n)for i=O,…,n. 
Then , zO=(y;π(y)) and zn:;t (y;π(y)). Hence , there exists j (l ~j三n) such that zi-l =(y ;π(y)) 
and zi :;t (y;π(y)). Therefore , agent j can manipulate fIT at (u 1,. .,Uj' Uj+ 1,... ,Un) via Uj. 
Q.E.D. 
5.3. The Minimal Provision Mechanism: The Case without Fixed Costs 
In this section we consider the case where the cost function is continuous , convex , 
strictly increasing, and c(O,...,O)=O. That is , the cost function has no fixed costs. We 
impose the following assumption on cost sharing rules , whic:h requires that cost sharing 
rules should have the same properties as the cost function. 
Assumption 5.1. Each cost sharing rule π=(1t j)jeN satisfies the following properties: 
each 1tj iscontinuous , convex , strictly increasing, and c(O,…,0)=0. 
Let I1c be the set of feasible cost shαring rules sαf々のJingAssumption 5.1. For any cost 
function c , the equal cost sharing rule and al other proportional cost sharing rules belong 
to I1c. 
5.3.1. The Case with One Public Good 
We consider economies with one private good x and one public good y. Since each cost 
sharing function πj is convex and each preference Uj is strictly convex , the maximal 
consumption bundle of Uj on Z~ is uniquely determined. Notice that given any cost 
sh紅ingrule π ， the useful information about each preference Uj reduces to its restriction on 
the consumption space Z~. Moreover, since there is a one to one and onto projection of 
Z~ on Y, we can regard the restricted preferences on Z~ as preferences on Y 
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For any n:ε TIc a如n凶d峠U , let (y幻山f〈引:(何川U町川lj
yγ*可川(何ωu川)=叫n y k ui )
Definition 5.4. The minimal pro\ノision mechanism fIT * associates (y * (u );π(y * (U))) 
with each Uεun .20 
Although we define the minimal provision mechanism in the form of direct revelation 
mechanisms, it works in a simple manner as follows. Each agent iεN has only to reveal 
his maximal c∞onsump伊戸tionbundle (σyガ山~ (卯u山川π爪i(σyガ山~ (何Ui))) 0ぱf1ωU坪1
chooses the minimum y訂:(1ωaωs the level 0ぱft出he pu山blicに g伊O∞O吋d and divides the c∞osts amon時g 
agents according toπ. 
Lemma 5.2. For aηY cost sharing rule πε IIo the minimal provision mechanism fπ * 
sαtisfies strαtegy-proofness αnd individual rationality. 
Proof. Consider the res廿iction of UjE U on Zf. Let Uj denote the set of al preferences 
on Zf obtained by such restriction. Since each cost sharing fu削lonπj is convex and 
prefe印nce Ui is strictly convex, each preference in Ui is single peaked on Zf.21 Then , the 
usual argument on single peakedness proves that fπ * satisfies strategy-proofness (see 
Black (1 948) , Moulin (1980) , and Barbera and Jackson (1 994) , for details). Further, 
since 0三γ(u):~::S ~(Uj) for al UE Un and iE N , single peakedne:ss implies that 
Uj(O ;O)~Uj(y * (U); n: i(Y、1)))壬Uj(y ~ (吋;n: j(y ~ (Ui))). This show:s that fIT * satisfies indi vidual 
rationality. Q.E.D. 
We introduce the definition of the full-range property and characterize the set of 
20 The minimal provision mechanism chooses a cost share equilibrium for any uε un such that 
γ(u)=y~ (Ui) for al1iεN 
21 A preference Ui is single peaked on zf if y'<y"<yt (Ui) implies 
判~ . ... . U I(y';π i(y'))<UI(y";πi(y"))<Ui(yi (U i)川(yi (Ui))) 加d yi (Ui)<y"<y' implies 
U i(Y~ (U i)九 (yt (Ui)))>Ui(y";π i(y"))>UI(y' ;7ti(Y'). 
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strategy-proof, individually rational mechanisms with the ful1-range property. 
Definition 5.5. A mechanism rc satisfies the full-range properηiff for al 
yε[O ，Ymax] ， there exists uεun such that rc(u)=(y;π(y)). 
Theorem 5.1. For any cost sharing rule たI10 the minimal proνision mechanis11l 
fπ * is the unique mechαnism satiめling strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and the 
full-range property. 
Proof. 1t follows from Lemma 5.2 that rc * satisfies strategy-proofness and individual 
rationality. It is clear that rc * satisfies the full-range property. We prove uniqueness. 
Suppose toward contradiction that there exists a mechanism rc other than rc 寓 that
satisfies the premises of the theorem. The allocations of rc and f1t * 紅e different at some 
uεun . We consider two possible cases. 
First, suppose that there exists Uεun such that f1t(u)=(yl ;:Tt(yl )), where yl <y、1) (see 
Figure 5.1). Without loss of generality , we can assume Y * (u)=y~(Ul)三沿い2)三 勾~(un)
by permuting indexes of agents. Then , it holds that y* (u)=y 1 (ul)::;t y~(Un) ， otherwise it 
follows from Lemma 5.1 that f1t( u )=(y * (u);π(y* (u))). Let j be the smallest index such t出ha叫t 
y *可、、(れu併I
Uk(匂y;ぶω(れ似UkυJよ);刀7πt町恥k以<(y叫;ぶω(れ何Ukωk))リ)=瓦両k以<(0伐;0め). Then, by the construction of 同 , f1t(Uj ,U_j)=(y2; π (y2)) , 
where y2Eε [O ，yイ幻j(ω何u町刷1有j
h加01凶d心s t出ha瓜t y2~壬勾Y1 , otherwise a勾ge叩ntりJ ca如nma釦nl中pu叫la蹴t匂e f1tπ a剖tu v吋ia 司 Similarly , 
f1t (Uj , Uj+ 1, U_j ,_[j+ 1州y3 ;n:(戸))， where y3E [O ,yj+l (Uj+l)] , 0伽wise indi vidual rationality 
is not satisfied for agent j+ 1. Hence, it holds that y3~y2 ， otherwise agent j+ 1 can 
manipulate f1t at (Uj' U_j) via Uj+l' Applying this argument to each agent k such that 
y * (u)均~(Uk) successively, we obtain f1t(Ul ，. . .， Uj_l ， Uj' 一. ,un)=(y;n:(Y)), where 
子三yl<y * (U). However, it follows from Lemma 5.1 that 
f1t(Ul , .・・，Uj_ ぃ百j ，. • .ぷn)=(y勺l); n: (y 本 (u))). This is a contradiction. 
Next, suppose that there exists uεun such that 0(u)=(y1 ;n:(y 1 )), where y勺l)<yl (see 
Figure 5.2). Without loss of gene凶ity ， we assume y* (u)=y;(ul)gd(U2)三壬y~(Un). Let 
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百lεUbe such that 紅gmax(百 1 ;Z~)=(y* (u);n 1 (y勺1))) ， and for some Y2ε(y不 (u)51) .
Ul(y2;π1 (y2))=u 1 (0;0). It follows from individual rationality for agent 1 that 
fIT(百]， U-l)=(γ;π(γ)) ， where y3ε[0 ，y2]. Choose y4 such that 
Ul(Y4;π) (γ))=ulGl;π) cY)))， if any. Ifthere is no such y4 , then any y3ε[0 ，y2] i 
strictly prefe汀ed to y 1 at u 1, and thus agent 1 can manipulate 0 at u via u). Hence, there 
exists such y4. Notice that for al yε(Y4 ， yl) ， Ul(y;πl(y))>Ul(yhπl(y4))=U)(yl;πl(Yl)). 
If y3ε(γ ， y2] ， then agent 1 can manipulate 0 at u via Ul ・ Then ， y3 must be in [0,y4]. 
Hence, it holds that y¥;y4 <y* (百 1 ，U-l). Appl ying the first argumen t to(五 1 ， u_))εU n leads 
to a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
Moulin (1994) studies mechanisms that determine both the level of public goods and 
the cost share. He characterizes the mechanism satisfying coalitional strategy-proofness , 
individual rationality , symmetry, and the full-range property. The proof of his theorem 
consists of two steps. First, he shows, from a result of Moulin (1993) , that any 
coalitional strategy-proof and symmetric mechanism divides the costs equally. Next, he 
shows , from a result of Barbera and J ackson (1994) improving upon Moulin (1 980) , that 
any mechanism satisfying his four axioms provides rninimal public goods. 
On the other hand, Theorem 5.1 applies to mechanisms that determine only the level of 
public goods , assuming that the cost sharing rule is exogenously given. However, we 
use only strategy-proofness, individual rationa1ity , and the full-range property. All the 
results in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 co打espond to Mou1in's second step. They can be 
extended to his type of results , because our class of cost sharing rules includes the equal 
cost sharing rule. 
In addition to strategy-proofness and individual rationality , the full-range property 
plays an important role in Theorem 5.1. Even if we drop the full-range property , a similar 
result stil holds when we consider the set of mechanisms whose range contains the 
origin , and is closed and connected. However, the existence or the uniqueness of 
trategy-proof and individually rational mechanisms is strongly dependent on the range of 
mechanisms. Several range conditions 紅e discussed in Section 5.4. 
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5.3.2. The Case with Several Public Goods 
We consider econornies with one private good X and two or rnore public goods Y 1, • • • ,y m 
(m~2). 1n contrast to the case of one private good and one public good, we can derive the 
following negative result from a general result of Zhou (1991a). 
Theorem 5.2. For any cost sharing rule πε IIo there is no mechanism f7r satisfying 
strategy-proofness, indiνidual rationality, and dim( R(門店2. 22
Proof. Consider the restriction of UjεU on Zr. Let U j denote the set of al preferences 
on Zr obtained by such restriction. Let U denote the set of al continuous and strictly 
convex preferences on Y. For each vεU ， we can find some UjεUj such that Uj and v are 
the same preferences with respect to the public goods components since each cost sharing 
function πj is continuous, convex , and strictly increasing, and each preference Uj is 
continuous , strictly convex , and monotonic. Hence, U j includes the set of al continuous 
and strictly convex preferences with respect to the public goods components. 1n such an 
environment, a general result of Zhou (1991a) proves that strategy-proofness and 
dim(R( fIT) )三2 imply dictatorship.23 We show that dictatorship is inconsistent with 
indi vidual rationality. Suppose that agent iεN is the dictator. Let uεUn be such that 
紅gmax(uj;R(ff))=(Yl ，... ,Ym;Xj):;t(O,...,O;O) and argmax(uj;Zj)=(O ,...,O;O) for some j釘
A dictatorial mechanism fIT associates (y;π(y)) ， where y=(YI ,... ,ym) , with uεUn . 
1ndividual rationality is not satisfied for agent j because 
Uj(O ,... ,0; O)>Uj(fj(u) )=Uj(y;πj(y)). Q.E.D. 
5.4. Impossibility Results: The Case with Fixed Costs 
22 If the range of mechanisms isonly one-dimension (that is , the range is a straight line through the 
origin with respect to Y) , the minimal provision mechanism is the unique mechanism satisfying strategyｭ
proofness , individual ratíonality , and the full-range property along the one-dimensionalline. 
23 A mechanism f isdictatorial if there exists agent iεN ， who is cal1ed the dictator, such that for al 
uεun and ZiεR(tf) ， ul(tf(u))~UI(Zi). 
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In this section, we consider the case where the cost function lhas positive fixed costs ・
Each cost function c isrepresented by the form C=Cf+Cv, where Cf isthe fixed cost 
function and CV isthe variab1e cost function. We assume that cf(O ,...,O)=O , 
Cf(Yl ,... ,Ym)=C >0 if (Yl ,... ,Ym):;t(O ,…,0) , and CV iscontinuous , convex , strictly 
increasing , and CV(O,...,O)=O. No cost sharing ru1e considered in Section 5.3 is feasib1e 
in such a situation since it is not feasib1e sufficient1y near the origin. We deal with cost 
sharing r此s in which each cost sharing functionπj is represented byπj=π(+πi ， where 
πf is a fixed cost sharing function and πi is a variab1e cost 山ring function. We impose 
the following assumption on cost sharing rules. 
Assumption 5.2. Each cost sharing ru1e π=(7t j)jeN=(π(+πi)ie N satisfies the 
following properties: for each iεN ， πf(o ，...，O)=O ， πf(Yl ，... ，Ym)=ξi >0 if 
(y 1, • • • ,y m):;t (O ,…,0) , where エ ξi=C， and πi is continuous, convex , strict1y increasing , 
ieN 
and 1ぐ (0 ，…，0)=0.
Let TIc be the set of feasible cost sharing rules sati宅fyingAssumption 5.2. For any cost 
function c , the equa1 cost sharing ru1e and al other proportiona1 cost sharing rules belong 
to TIc. Notice that any cost sharing ru1eπεTIc divides fixed costs among every agent, 
namely , every agent has to pay the share of fixed costs Ci if public goods are provided. 
Thus , each cost sharing function πi is not convex ne紅 the origin, and πi is not 
continuous at the origin. 
5.4.1. The Case with One Public Good 
We consider economies with one private good x and one public good y. Since each agent 
has positive fixed cost share, each cost sharing function 7tj isneither continuous nor 
convex on the who1e domain. The restriction of any UjεU on Z~ is no 10nger single 
peaked. Hence, the minimal provision mechanism does not work as in the case without 
fixed costs. However, if we restrict the range of mechanisms properly , the minimal 
provision mechanism may satisfy strategy-proofness and individual rationality. The 
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fo11owing two lemmas indicate how to restrict the range of mechanisms. 
Lemma 5.3. Gi1ノen any cost sharing rule πε IIe ， ザα mechanism fTr satiぞfiesstrategy-
proofness, then R(f勺 is closed.24 
Proof. Choose any (y;π(y))εClosure(R(f1t)). If y=Ü , (y;π(y)) is an isolated point of 
z1t, and thus (y;π(y))εR( f1t). We consider the case of yε(Ü ，Ymax)' Choose uεu n such 
that argmax(ui;Zf)=(y;TCi(y)) for a1 iεN. Suppose toward contradiction that 
f1t(u)=(子;rr(デ))， where 子学y. We can choose y' and y" such that yε(y' ， y") ， 
Ui(ゲ ;πi(ゲ) )>Ui(Ü;Ü) , Ui(ゲ ;rri(ゲ ))>Ui(デ;rri(デ))， and Ui(y";πi(y"))>Uj(デ;TC1(デ)) for a1 iEN. 
Since (y;rr(y))εClosure(R(f1t))， there exists some (y;rr(y))εR(f1t) such that yε(y' ， y"). For 
al iE N , choose UiεU such that 紅gmax(Ui ;Zf)=(y;πi(Y))' Then, f1t(百 1 ， U_l)=(yl;π(yj )), 
where ylε Y\(y' ，y") ， otherwise agent 1 can manipulate f1t at u via Uj ・ Similarly ，
f1t(U 1, U2 , U・ 1 ， _2)=(y2;rr(y2)) ， where y2ε Y\(y'ゲ')， otherwise agent 2 can manipulate f1t at 
(Uj ,U-l) via U2. Applying this argument successively, we obtain f1t(u)=(yn;rr(子勺)， where 
ynE Y\(y',y"). It contradicts the fact that f1t(u)=(y;π(y)) by Lemma 5.1. Therefore, 
f1t(u)=(y;π(y)) ， and thus (y;π(y))εR(f1t). The remaining case of y=y max is similar. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 5.4. Given αny cost shαring γule 冗モロ~， if α mechαnism fTr satisfies 
individuα1 rationαlity， then (0;0， … ， 0)モ R(fπ).
Proof. It is straightforward from the definition of individual rationality and the 
existence of UiεU such that argmax(ui;Zf)=(??. Q.E.D. 
These range conditions 訂e necess紅y and sufficient for the existence of strategy-proof 
and individually rational mechanisms in the case without fixed costs. However, they are 
not sufficient in the case with fixed costs. 
24 A closed range of mechanisms is a necessary condition for strategy-proofness in several environments. 
See Barbera and Pe]eg (1 990), Zhou (1 991a), and Barbera and Jackson (1994). 
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Definition 5.6. A cost sharing ruleπεIIc is essentially conνex on WC Y if each πl 
nT 25 lS convex on w 
In the above definition it is not required that W be a convex set in Y. For anyπεIIc 
and any WcY, let Zπ(W)={ (y;π(y))1 YεW} and Zf(W)={ (y;πj(y))1 YεW}. Figures 5.3 
and 5.4 give some examples of Zf(W) , where πi is convex on a closed set W. The 
maximal consumption bundles of UjεU on Zf(W) consist of a single consumption bundle 
or two consumption bundles , when W is closed and f isesseJrltially convex on W. Denote 
such consumption bundles by (yt(ui)lw;πi(yt(Ui)lw)) and (y~ (ui)lw;1t i(ガ (ui)I~)) ， where 
yt(ui)lw 三y~(ui)lw. Notice that if yt(ui)Iw7=Y~ (ui)lw for some UiE U , then (y;π(y)) !l Zπ(W) for 
allyε(yf(Ui)|w， ykui)|w)For anyuεun ， let y+(u)lw=rniP yt(ui)lw and y*(u)lw=rniP y~(uj)lw ieN 一 i e N
For any uεun ， let T(u)={iεNI y+(u)lw=yt(uj)lw and γ(u)lw=y~ (uj)lw} be the set of agents 
with minimal demand for the public good. We define a class of mechanisms similar to the 
minimal provision mechanism defined in Section 5.3. 
Definition 5.7. Given a cost sharing rule πεIIc and a closed set W CY such thatπlS 
essentially convex on W and 0εW， a mechanism f1t into Zπ(VV) is in the class of minimal 
proνision mechanisms if it associates either (y+(u)lw;π(y+(u)lw)) or (y*(u)lw;π(y* (u)lw) 
with each uεun . 
Notice that this definition allows that a mechanism f1t into Zπ(W) associates 
(y+(u)lw;π(y+(u)lw)) for some uεun ， and (y*(u)lw;π(y*(u)lw)) for another uεu n . 
We characterize the set of strategy-proof and individually rational mechanisms with the 
range condition R(f1t)=Zπ(W). The condition R(f1t)=Zπ(W) ll1eans that f1t satisfies the full-
range property on W. 
25 Notice that any proportional cost sh訂ingrule πis essentially convex on WcY ifand only if the cost 
function c isconvex on W. 
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Theorem 5.3. For any cost sharing rule πε IIc and any closed set WC Y such tlzat π 
is essentially convex on W and 0ε W， α mechanism fTC into Zπ(W) satisfies strategy-
proofness, individual rationaliの， and R(f勺=Zπ(W) if and only if it is in the class of 
minimal proνision mechanisms and it satisfies the following Condition ( α).・
for any u, UE UIl such thαty+(u)lwヲ+(両Iw*y 汁uj|w=y *仰い T(u)コ T(u)， and Ui=lii 
for all iε T(玩)， it holds that either fTC(u)=(y+(u)lw;n(y+(u)lw)) or 
F向)=(y *伝)I w，・π(y *同)I w)).
Proof. Necessity. It follows immediately from Theorern 5.1 that if a mechanism f1t 
into Zπ(W) satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality , and R(fTC)=Zπ(W) ， then it 
is in the class of minimal provision mechanisms. Here we show that it satisfies Condition 
(α). Suppose toward contradiction that a mechanism f1t into Zπ(W) satisfies strategy-
proofness, individual rationality , R(f1t)=Zπ(W) ， and that for some u，玩εu n such that 
y+(u)lw=y+(U) Iw*γ(u)lw=y * (百)Iw， T(u)コT(百)， and Uj=Uj for al iE T(u) , 
fTC(u)=(y* (u)lw;n(y* (u)lw)) and f1t(u)=(y+(百)Iw;π(y+(u)lw)). 
Consider some i~T(u) ， if any. Notice that, by the definition of T(U), 
百j(y*(u)lw;πj(y*(u)lw))>百j(y+(u)lw;nj(y+(u)lw)) since πi is convex on W and Uj is strictly 
convex. It follows from strategy-proofness and the fact that f7t into Zπ(W) is in the class 
of minimal provision mechanisms that fTC(uj , U_j)=(y+(厄)Iw;π(y+(百)Iw)). Repeat this 
紅gumentfor al i~ T(百) and notice that Uj=Uj for al iεT(u). f[ence , we obtain 
fTC( u )=(y+(u)lw;π(y+(u)lw)) ， which is a contradiction. 
Sufficiency. Suppose that a mechanism f1t into Z7t(W) is in the class of minimal 
provision mechanisms and it satisfies Condition (α). Choose any UεUn.lf 
y+(百)lw=Y * (百)Iw， then it follows from a similar 訂gument to Lemma 5.2 that no agent can 
manipulate fTC at U. Consider the case of y+(U) I w>tγ(U) lw. For each iεT(U)， one of the 
maximal consumption bundles of Uj on Zf(W) is given by f1t(百). For each i~ T(u) , agent i 
may be able to change the allocation of f1t in his favor by changing his preference into 
omeujεu. 
If f1t(百)=(y+(u)lw ;π(y+(めIw)) ， we consider the following six cases. 
Case 1. y *(百)lw<yt(uj)lw
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Case 2. y*(u)kv=yt(uj)lw 
Case 3. y+(百)1~=yt(Uj)lwand y *(u)lw=y~(uj)lw 
Case 4. y+(u)lw=yt(uj)lw=y~ (uj)lw 
Case 5. yt(uj)lw<y~ (uj)lw=y+(百)Iw
Case 6. y~ (uj)lw<y+(百)Iw
In Cases 1, 2, and 3, preference profile U and (Uj , U-i) satisfy the premises of Condition 
(α). Therefore , it holds that F(uj , U_j)=(y+(百)Iw;π(y+(U) lw)) since 
fIT(u):;t(y * (u)lw;1t (y * (函)Iw)). In Case 4, since F is in the class ()f minimal provision 
mechanisms , it holds that fIT(Uj ，江j)=(Y+(百)Iw;π(y+(U)lw)). In Cases 5 and 6, it holds that 
either F(uj , U-j)=(Yiト(u ï)lw;π(yt(Uj)lw)) or F(uj , U_j)=(y~ (uj)lw;π(y~(Uj)lw)). Since πj lS 
convex on W , Uj is strictly convex, and y+(百)lw<yt(Uj)lw，it is clear that ff(Uj ，江 j) is not 
any better than ff(u) for i~ T(百) at Uj. It is easy to check the case of 
F(u)=(y*(u)lw;1t(y*(u)lw). Therefore, for each i~T(玩)， agent i can not manipulate fIT at 
百εun . Then , F into Zπ(W) satisfies strategy-proofness. Not:ice that 
0::;)ぺu)lw::;y 本 (u)1ぷy~ (uj)lw for al UE Un and iεN. Since 1tj isconvex on W and any UjεU 
is strictly convex , it holds that 
Uj (O;O):;Uj (y+(u)lw;πj(y+(u)lw))釦j(y、l)lw ;1t j(y* (u)lw) ):;Uj(y ~ (uj)lw;1tj (y~ (uj)lw). This 
implies that fIT into Zπ(W) satisfies individual rationality. It is clear that R(F)=Zπ(W). 
Q.E.D. 
In the class of minimal provision mechanisms , we choose the following mechanism 
and cal it the minimal provision mechanism henceforth. We will show that the minimal 
provision mechanism is on the Pareto frontier of the class of the minimal provision 
mechanisms. We say that a mechanism :F weakly Pareto dominates f7t if for al Uεu n and 
iεN ， uj(ff(u))三Uj(tf(u)).
Definition 5.8. Gi ven a cost sharing rule πεTIc and a c10sed set W cY such thatπis 
essentially convex on 羽T and 0ε 羽T ， the minimal provision mechαnism fπ * into Zπ(W) 
associates (y*(u)lw;π(y*(叫ん)) with each Uεun . 
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Theorem 5.4. For any cost sharing rule た IIc and any closed set WcY such tlzat π 
is essentially convex on Wand 0ε W， αny mechanism f7r into Z勺W) satiゆingstrategy-
proofness, indiνidual rationality, and R( f勺=Z勺W) is weakly Pareto dominated by the 
minimal proνision mechanism fπ * into Zπ(W). 
Proof. It follows from Theorem 5.3 that any mechanism fIT into Zπ(W) satisfying 
strategy-proofness, individual rationality , and R(fIT)=Zπ(W) is in the class of minimal 
provision mechanisms. Clearly , y+吋(ω州u吋州)川|いw壬勾yγf戸ぺ*可、(れω州u吋州1)川|いW壬yガ山~(卯u町附1j
is convex on W and Uj is strictly convex, it holds that 
Uj(y+(u)lw;πj(y+(u)lw))~Uj(y*(u)lw;πj(y*(州w))壬1以y~ (Uj)lw;1t i(Y~ (uj)lw)) for al 取un and 
iεN. Since fIT * into Zπ(W) always chooses (y* (u)lw;π(y*(u)lw)) ， any mechanism fIT into 
zπ(W) satisfying the premises of the theorem is weakly Pare1to dominated by fIT :;< into 
Z冗(W). Q.E.D. 
We consider the opposite case ofTheorem 5.3. We define the non-convexity of cost 
sharing rules on a triplet T , three distinct points in Y , and show that it is impossible to 
construct s廿ategy-proofand individually rational mechanisms if the range of mechanisms 
includes three allocations which induce the non-convexity of cost sharing rules. 
Definition 5.9. A cost sharing rule πεTIc is essentially ηon-conνex on a triplet TcY 
if eachπi is non-convex on T , that is , 1tj(y2) >斗ヰπj(yl) +止y'πj(y3) for 
Y'-Y' Y"-Y' 
T={yl ， y2 ， y3εY I yl<y2<y3} .26 
Theorem 5.5. For any cost sharing rule πε 刀~ I there is no mechanism f7r satiめJing
strategy-proo_外1，eSS， individual rationality, and such that R(fπ) contains Zπ(T)for some 
triplet TcY on which f isessentially non-conνex. 
26 Notice that any proportional cost sharing rule πis essentially non-convex on some triplet TcY ifand 
only if the cost function c isnon-convex on 丁 For any subset WcY, any proportional cost sharing rule 
πis either essential1y convex on W or essentially non-convex on some triplet TcW. 
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Proof. Suppose toward contradiction that there exist a mechanism f1t and some tr中let
TcY which satisfy the premises of the theorem. Since each variable cost sharing function 
π~ is convex on Y , 0εY must be included in this triplet T. Let 0 , y' , and y" (O<y'<y") be 
the elements of T. Let S(y') and S(y") be some closed segments in Y including y' , y" , 
respectively. Let S([y' ,y"]) be some closed segment in Y inc:luding S(y') and S(y"). 
Denote the boundary points of S by Bd(S). If y"学Ymax， choose S(y') , S(y") , and 
S([y' ,y"]) such that y'~Bd(S(y')) ， y"~Bd(S(y")) ， S(y')nS(y")=の，
Bd(S(y'))ハBd(S([y' ，y"]))=の， Bd(S(y") )nBd(S([y' ， y"]))ごの， O~Bd(S([y' ， y"])) ， and that 
f isessentially non-convex on {O}uBd(S(y")). If y"=Ymax , choose S(y') , S(y") , and 
S([y' ,y"]) such that y'~Bd(S(y')) ， {y"} :;tS(y") , S(y')ハS(y")=の，
B d (S(y') ) nB d (S ( [ゲ，y"]))=の， O~Bd(S([y' ，y"])) ， and that f isessentially non-convex on 
{O} uBd(S(y")). We can find the following four types of preferences for each agent (see 
Figures 5.5 -5.8). 
(i) Uj: argmax(ui;Zf)=(y';1t j(ゲ)) and Ui(y;πj(y))=Ui(O;O) for al yεBd(S(y')). 
(ii) 江j: argmax(江i;Z?)=(yH;πj(Y")) ，日i(y;πj(y))=五j(O;O) for al yεBd(S([y' ,y"]))\ {y"} , 
andElGl;πlGl))=五j cY2 ;πj(y2)) for yl ， y2εBd(S(y"))\{y"} . 
(ii) ﾛj: argmax(琮 ;Zf)=(y';πi(ゲ))，立j(y;1t i(y))=Ûj(O;O) for al yεBd(S([y' ， y"]))\{ y"} , 
and Ûi(デ l;πj(デ 1))=立i(y2;1t j(y2)) for テ l ， Y2εBd(S(y')).
(iv) Uj: argmax(ui;Zf)=(y";1ti(y")) and Uj(y;πi(y))=瓦i(O;O) for al yεBd(S(γ))\{y"}. 
Notice that Ui(y;1tj(y))>Ui(O;O) for al yεS(y') and Ûi(y;πi(y))>Ûi(O;O) for al yεS(y"). 
By Lemma 5.1 , f1t(u)=(ゲ ;π(ゲ)). Even if agent n changes his preference into Un, 
individual rationality for agent 1 requires f1t(un, u-n)=(y;π(y)) ， where yε{O }uS(y'). If 
y=O, agent n can manipulate f1t at (un, u-n) via un since un(y' ;'1t n (y'))>百n(O;O). Hence, 
yεS(y'). Again, individual rationality for agent 1 requires f1t(百n-l ，Un, U-[n-l ]， -n)=(Y;π(y)) ， 
where yε{O}uS(y'). If y=O, agent n-1 can manipulate f1t at (Un-l ,Un ,U-[n-I] ,-n) via Un-I 
since 江n・ 1(y;1tn-l (y) )>Un・ 1(0;0) for al yεS(y'). Hence , YE S(y'). Applying this argument 
successively, we obtain 
f1t(u] ,U-l )=(y;π(y)) ， where yεS(y'). (5.1 ) 
By Lemma 5.1 , f1t(函 1 ，U2 , U_] ,-2)=(y" ;1t(y")). Individual rationality for agent 2 requires 
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pt(ÛI ,U2 ,U_I ,_2)=(y;n:(y)) , where yε{O }uS(y"). If y=O, agent: 1 can manipulate fIT at 
(ÛI ， U2，江 1 ， -2) via U 1 since ﾛ 1 (y";n: 1 (y"))>立 1(0;0). Hence, we obtain 
fIT(古 1 ,u2 , U_I ，・ 2)=(y;π(y)) ， where yεS(y"). 
By Lemma 5.1 , fIT(百)=(y";n: (y")). Individual rationality for agent 1 requires 
pt(ﾛ 1, U_ 1)=(テ;n:(子))， where yε{O}uS([y' ，y"]). If y=O, agent 1 can manipulate fπat 
(ﾛ 1 , U_ 1) via U 1 since 立 1(y";n:l (y"))>立 1(0;0). Hence, we obtain 
fIT(ﾛ 1 ，江 1)=(子;n:(デ))， where yES([y' ,y"]). 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
If y~S(y') ， it follows from (5.1) and (5.3) that agent 1 can manipulate fIT at (ÛI ,U_I) 
via u 1 since ﾛ 1 (y;π1 (y))>ﾛl (y;π1 (y)) for al yεS(y') and yεS([y' ,y "])\S(ゲ). If 弘 S(y") ，
it follows from (5.2) and (5.3) that agent 2 can manipulate fIT at (立)，百-1) via U2 since 
U2(y;n: 2(y))>百2(y;n:2(Y)) for al yεS(y") and yεS([y' ，yl])\S(y"). Therefore，テ mustbe in 
both S(y') and S(y") , which contradicts the assumption that S(y')ハS(y")=の Q.E.D.
5.4.2. The Case with Several Public Goods 
We consider econornies with one private good x and several public goods YI ,... ,ym 
(m2:2). We present the same negative result as in the case of no fixed costs. 
Theorem 5.6. For any cost sharing rule πε IIc ， there is no mechanism fn satiめllng
strategy-proφ'less， indiνidual rationality， αnd dim(R(fりた2. 
Proof. Suppose toward contradiction that there exists a rnechanism pt which satisfies 
the premises of the theorem. It follows from the same reason as Lemma 5.4 that 
individual rationality requires (0,.. .， 0;0，…，0)εR(fπ). Since dim(R(pt))三2 ， we can choose 
y' , y"εY such that (y';π(y'))εR(pt) ， (y";π(y"))εR(pt) ， and 0 , y' , y" are not on a straight 
line. Consider the case of y' , y"~Bd(Y). Let S(y') and S(y") be some closed sets in Y 
including y' , y" , respectively. Let S({y' ,y"}) be some closed set in Y including S(y') and 
S(y"). We can choose sufficiently large and strictly convex sets S(ゲ)， S(y") , and 
S( {y' ,y"}) such that y'~Bd(S(y')) ， y"~Bd(S(y")) ， S(y')nS(y")=の，
Bd(S(y'))nBd(S( {y' ,y"} ))=0, Bd(S(y"))ハBd(S( {y' ,y"} ))==の and O~Bd(S( {y' ,y"} ). 
Here, a sufficiently large set means a set including points near the origin. Then , we can 
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construct the preferences used in Theorem 5.5. AlI the other cases are similar. The rest of 
the proof is the same as Theorem 5.5. Q.E.D. 
5.4.3. The Case of Linear Cost Sharing Rules 
As a corollary of Theorems 5.5 and 5.6, we present a simple negative result. Let Ilc be 
the subset of IIc satiめling the followiηg Assumption 5.3. 
Assumption 5ふ Each variable cost sharing function n:j' islinear. 
Corollary 5.1. For any cost sharing rule πε IIc , there is no mechanism fn satiぞかllng
strategy-proゆess， individual rationaliη， αnd #R(fりさ3.
Proof. It follows immediately from Theorem 5.5 when the range of mechanisms is 
one-dimension, and from Theorem 5.6 when the range of mechanisms is greater than 
one-dimension. Q.E.D. 
5.5. Conclusion 
We showed that the minimal provision mechanism is the unique mechanism satisfying 
strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and the full-range property in economies with 
one private good and one public good when the cost sh紅ing rule has the convex 
property. Even if the cost sharing rule has positive fixed cost:s and thus it includes a nonｭ
convex portion , the proper restriction of the range of mechanisms guarantees that the 
minimal provision mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness and individual rationality 
Conversely , if the restriction is not sufficient, the implied non-convexity of the cost 
sharing rule leads to an impossibility result. Moreover, we proved that there is no 
strategy-proof and individually rational mechanism in econolrues with one private good 
and several public goods. 
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Chapter 6 
Strategy-Proof and Individually Rational l¥1echanisms 
for Public Good Economies: A Note ***料
6.1. Introduction 
We consider economies with one private good and one public good. We consider 
mechanisms that determine both the level of the public good and how to divide the costs 
among agents. Serizawa (1996) characterizes the set of mechanisms named 、erruconvex
cost sharing schemes determined by the minimum demand principle" by strategy-
proofness , individual rationality , no exploitation, and non-bossiness. However, there is a 
criticism on the non-bossiness axiom since the economic inte:rpretation of non-bossiness 
is not so clear. Moreover, he leaves an open question whether or not non-bossiness is 
necessary for his characterization. Therefore, it is an interesting question what class of 
mechanisms is characterized without non-bossiness. We show that if a mechanism 
satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality , and no exploitation, then it also 
satisfies non-bossiness. As a corollary , we characterize the set of strategy-proof, 
individually rational , and no exploitative mechanisms. 
6.2. Notation and Definitions27 
Let N={ 1,…,n} (n三2) be the set of agents. There is one private good and one public 
good. For each agent iεN， we denote agent i's endowment of the private good by ej. The 
initial amount of the public good is assumed to be zero. The public good can be produced 
using the private good which is regarded as money. For each agent iεN， we denote agent 
i's consumption of the private good by Xj. The amount of the public good is denoted by 
y. The cost function c(y) of the public good is a continuous and increasing function from 
*** This chapter is based on Deb and Ohseto (1999). 
27 We follow the model in Serizawa (1996). 
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R+ to R+ su山hatc(O)=O and for al yE~， lim il].f c(y+E) -C(YL> 0 , 
E •+ü f二
lim sup c(y+ε) -c(y) く∞， lim inf ~(y) ー c(y-εL> 0, lim sup 豆丘三立さL< ∞. The set of 
E • +0 E E → +0ε 
feasible allocations is Z= {(x 1, • . . ,Xn ;y)εR~+ll c(y)=エ (ej-Xj)}.
Each agent iεN has a preference on R~ which can be represented by a utility function 
Uj(Xj ,y). Let U be the set of continuous , strictly convex , and strictly increasing 
preferences on R~. A list u=(u 1,... ，u n)εUn is called a preference profile. We denote 
generic elements of U by Uj , Uj , Ûj ,..., and generic elements of Un by u, U, 
respectively. Given UεUn ， i, jεN ， UjEU , and 向εU， we denote by (百j ，U_j) the preference 
profile obtained from u after the replacement of Uj by 百j ， and by (Uj , Ûj , U_j ,_j) the 
pぱérenceprofile obtained from U afl町批 replacementof Uj and Uj by Uj and 琮. The 
upper contour set and the lower contour set of UjεU at (支j ，Y)εR~ are defined by U C( U j; 
(天j ，y))= {(Xj ,y)1 Uj(Xj ， y)三Uj(支j ， y)} and LC(Uj; (支j ，y))= {(xi ,y)1 Uj(支j ， y)三Uj(Xj ， y)} , 
respectively. A mechanism is a function f: Un• Z, which associates a feasible allocation 
with each preference profile. Given a mechanism f and UεUn ， we will write 
f(U)=(Xl(U) ，...，X山l);Y(U)) and fj(u)=(Xj(U) ,y(u)). 
Definition 6.1. A mechanism f satisfies strategy-proofness i百 for al UεUn ， iεN ， 
and 百iεU ， ui(fj(u))三ui(fj(Uj ，U_j). 
Definition 6.2. A mechanism f satisfies indiνidual rationality if for al UεUn and 
iεN ， uj(fi(u))三Uj(ej ， O).
Definition 6.3. A mechanism f satisfies no exploitation if for al UεUn and iεN ， 
Xj(U)壬ej ・
Definition 6.4. A mechanism f satisfies non-bossiness if for al Uεun ， iεN ， and 
UjεU ， [fj(u)=fj(uj , U_j) コ f(u)=f(Uj ，U_j)]. 
Strategy-proofness states that truthful revelation of preferences is a dominant strategy 
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for each agent. lndividual rationality requires that al agents end up no worse off than at 
the status quo. No exp1oitation requires that no agent receive the private good in addition 
to his endowment of the private good. Non-bossiness requires that by changing his 
preferences, no agent can change the al1ocation without changing his consumption 
bund1e. 
6.3. Results 
Theorem 6.1. If a mechanism f satiぞfies strategy-proofness, indilノidual rationαlity， 
and no exploitation, then f satisfies non-bossiness.28 
Proof. Suppose that a mechanism f satisfies strategy-proofness , individua1 rationality , 
and no exp1oitation. The proof is divided into three steps. 
Step 1. Suppose that y( u)=y(u) αndf(u)手f(u) foγsome u， lた U I1 . Then, for αれY iEN , 
there exists some Ui lモ Usuch that y(五ÌJ U-i)=Y(ui, u-iJ and f(u?u-iJ手f(ui瓦-).
Case 1. Xj(u)=Xj(u). 
We can choose some UjεU such that for al XjεR+， 
UC(百j; (Xj ,y(u))) (?LC(uj; (Xj ,y(u))) = {(Xj ,y(u))} , and 
UC(百j; (Xj ,y(u))) (? LC(百j; (Xj ,Y(u))) = {(Xj ,y(u))}. 
(6.1 ) 
(6.2) 
By (6.1) , strategy-proofness implies fj (江j ，u_j)=fj(u). By (6.2) , strategy-proofness 
implies fi (江i ，江i)=fj(u). Hence, y(百j ， U_j)=y(百j ，江i). The proof of this case is comp1ete if 
f(Uj , u_J;tf(uj , U-i). Assume to the contrary that f(むj ， u_i)=f(江j ， 1工 i). Then , it ho1ds that either 
f(u):;t f(百j ，U_j) or f(函):;t f(江j ，U_j). Without 10ss of genera1ity , we assume that f(u):;t f(百i ，U-i). 
Since the al1ocation is ba1anced and fj(u)=fj (百j ， U_j) , we can choose some agent j:;ti such 
that xj(u)>xj(江j ，U_j). We can choose some újεU su山hat
UC(Ûj; 月 (u)) ハ LC(uj; 月 (u)) = {ち (u)} ， and (6.3) 
28 Itfol1ows frorn Deb, Razzolini, and Seo (1995) and Ohseto (1999a) that strategy-proofness, individual 
rationality , and no exploitation irnply non-bossiness for the case of the binary provision of the public 
good (narnely , y=O or y=l) . 百1Î stheorern generalizes the result to the case of an arbitrary set of the level 
of the public good. The case of the binary provision or the continuous provision follows as a corol1ary of 
this theorem. 
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UC(ﾛj; (町，0)) (? LC(uj ; ち(百i ， U-i)) ハ{ (Xj川Iy三y(U)} =の (6.4 ) 
This construction is possible since f satisfies no exploitation (see Figure 6.1). B Y 
(6.3) , strategy-proofness implies fj(立j ，u_j)=fj(u). By (6 .4), strategy-proofness and 
individual rationality imply y(百i ，Ûj , U-i ,-j)<y(Ui , U-i). By strategy-proofness , 
ui(fi (立j ， U_j))三ui(fi (江i ，Ûj , U-i ,-j)) and 百i(fi (百l' 向， U ・ i ， -j))之江i(fi (立j ，U_j))' Hence , by (6.1 ), it 
must hold that fi (百i ，ﾛ} U-i ， _j)=fi (立j ， U・j)' This contradicts the fact that 
y(江i ， GJ'u-i ，ーj)<y(江i ，U-i)=y(U)=y(Ûj , U_j) 
Cαse 2. Xi(U):;tXi(U). 
We can choose some UiεU which satisfies (6.1) and (6.2) for al XiεR+ ・ By strategyｭ
proofness, fi (江i ， U ・ i)=fi(u) and fi (江i ， u_j)=fi (百). They imply Y(Ui , U-i)=Y(百i ，U-i) and 
f(百j ， u_i):;tf(百i ，U-i). 
Step 2. It holds thαt f( u)=f(u) for al u, uモ un such that y( u)=y(U). 
Assume to the contrary that y(u)=y(u) and f(u):;t f(百) for some u, UεUn. By Step 1, 
there exists some U IεU such that y(百 1 ， U-I)=Y(江1 ，江 1) and f(百 1 ，U_ 1 ):;tf(百 1 ，百-1)' Repeatedly 
applying Step 1 to the remaining agents , we can find U2E U，江戸 U ，...， U n-1εU such that 
y(Un, u-n)=y(扇町江n) and f(u n, u_n):;tf(un，江n)' Therefore , applying Step 1 to agent n leads 
to a contradiction. 
Step 3. f sαtisfies non-bossiness. 
It is obvious that for al UE U n, iεN ， and UiεU ， [fi(u)=fi(Ui , U-i) コ y(U)=y(Uj ，U-i)]. It 
follows from Step 2 that for al UεUn ， iεN ， and UiεU ， [y(U)=y(Ui , U-i) 二今 f(u)=f(百i ，U-i)]. 
Therefore , f satisfies non-bossiness. Q.E.D. 
We wiU explain the non-redundancy of the three axioms of strategy-proofness , 
individual rationality , and no exploitation for this theorem. Notice that any mechanism 
satisfies non-bossiness in the two-agent case. Each example below satisfies two axioms 
out of three , but does not satisfy the axiom of non-bossiness. 
Example 6.1. Let n=3 , e1=e2=e3=1 , and c(l)=1. Let a nlechanism f be such that for 
alluεUぺ ( i ) ifu1(0 ， 1)ミU1 (1,0), U2(0 , 1)三U2 (1，0) ， and U3(0 , 1)三U3 (l，0) ， then 
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f(u)=(0 ,1,1;1), (i) iful(0 ， 1)三U1 (1,0) , U2(0 ，1)三u2(l，0) ， and U3(0 , 1 )<U3(1 ,0) , then 
f(u)= (1,0 , 1;1), and (ii) iful(0 ,1)<Ul (1,0) or u2(0 ,1)<u2(1,0) , then f(u)= (l, l ‘1;0). 
Then, f satisfies individual rationality and no exploitation, but does not satisfy strategy-
proofness or non-bossiness. 
Example 6.2. Let n=3 , el=e2=e3=1 , and c(1)=1. Let a mechanism fbe such that for 
al uεu n ， (i) ifu3(0 ， 1)三U3 (1，0) ， then f(u)=(O , 1,1; 1), and (i) if U3(0 , 1 )<U3(l ,0) , then 
f(u)=( 1 ,0 , 1; 1). Then , f satisfies strategy-proofness and no exploitation , but does not 
satisfy individual rationality or non-bossiness. 
Example 6ふ Let n=3 , el =e2=e3= 1, and c( 1)=~. Let a mechanism f be such that for 
2 
al uεun ， (i) if U3(0 , 1)三u3(2 ，0) ， then f(u)=(三， 1 ， 0;1) ， (i) ifu3(2 ，0)>U3(0 ， 1)三u3 (l， 0) ，
2 
加制=(l ，j，川， and (州fu3(l ， 0)>町(川，伽削=(1， 1 ， 1;0). Then, f山
strategy-proofness and individual rationality, but does not satisfy no exploitation or non-
bossiness. 
6.4. Conclusion 
Serizawa (1996) defined the set of mechanisms called "sem昱onvex cost sharing schemes 
determined by the minimum demand principle".29 He characterized it by the four axioms 
of strategy-proofness , individual rationality , no exploitation, and non-bossiness. Now 
we establish the following new characterization as a corollary of his and our results.30 
Corollary 6.1. A mechanism f satisfies strategy-proo_βtess， individual rationality, 
αnd no exploitatiぴ1.if and only if f isa semiconvex cost sharing scheme determined by the 
minimum demαnd principle 
29 Refer to Serizawa (1996) for the precise definition. 
30 Using Theorem 6.1, most of the results in Serizawa (1996) can be reestablished without the non-
bossiness axiom. For example, itcan be shown that strategy-proofness, individual rationality. and no 
exploitation imply coa1itional strategy-proofness ・
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